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I. INTRODUCTION
If it may be assumed that there has been a religious revitalization in the United
States in recent years, then the theory that the common law follows a lethargic
course in its conformance to sociological change, gains additional proof. The courts
have shown little tendency to accord religious institutions and values any increased
recognition in the decisional process.
In continuing the biennial survey of the Church-State relationship, the Notre
Dame Lawyer has carefully re-examined the primary areas covered in the 1955-57
survey. In addition, contained herein is an analysis of a particular sphere of con-
troversy, that of Church gambling. The section on obscenity will be carried in the
forthcoming August issue of Volume 35.
In making a generic separation between religious institutions and values, several
observations may be made. The religious institution has been accorded a rather
unique place in society in the categories of taxation and zoning. This suggests, in
the form of a sort of quid pro quo, a general recognition of the desirability of the
church as an institution in a pluralistic society. However, despite general tax
exemption and the urban mobility accorded churches under zoning precedent, this
quid pro quo does not readily extend itself to the realistic needs of the school as
a religious institution. Even though the reported cases are spotted with statements
extolling the necessity of such a "supplementary" school system, the slightest hint
of positive aid is immediately rejected.
The jurisprudential emphasis is on the Church as an institution, however, and
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not upon its intrinsic composition of individuals embracing common values. Thus,
tax exemption is granted to religious schools and churches, but there is none given
members of a religious society who, in harmony with the group values, choose to
send their children to a parochial school rather than a tax supported public school.
Consistently, perhaps, an individual who seeks to carry his religious values
into the communicative dealings of everyday living, and who names them as such,
will find little advantage thereby to be gained in a court of law.
It is left for the individual conscience to translate religious values into a code
of morality and ethical conduct, and, in so doing, to gain ultimate favor in the
eyes of the law. It is in this tacit, but nevertheless real, influence that religious
values pervade the law.
It is in the marginal area, where morality and theology entwine, and where
ethical judgments differ, that religious values most consistently yield. Here, judges
are faced with the most perplexing enigmas and the end result must, of necessity,
reflect an independent value judgment of the individual jurist. Moved to deny the
value by traditional standards of decisional criteria, he can rarely choose the altern-
ative because of the often violent disagreement on the point at issue among diverse
religious sects. While "establishment" may be questionable in some cases, "prefer-
ence" is strictly taboo in all.
The result is one of the most fascinating studies in common law jurisprudence.
For each side of the church-state hyphen, it is an area of sporadic misunderstanding
and occasional keen insight, evolving about a core of judicial restraint and inarticu-
lated reasoning.
II. RELIGIOUS INSTITUTIONS
A. ZONING - Toward Increasing Urban Mobility
With the mushrooming of urban areas in this country, the necessity arises to
determine what uses of property will be permitted within these populated areas.
To this end zoning regulations and private restrictions have been enacted. The
validity, application, and effect of such ordinances has been a continuing source
of conflict. It is the purpose of the present survey to treat these questions as they
involve religious institutions. The cases analyzed involve zoning ordinances and
other forms of restrictions which in one manner or another tend to exclude the
building of churches and other religious structures' in urban areas. The constitu-
tionality2 of those ordinances and restrictions which tend to exclude religious insti-
tutions have been the subject of a number of state court decisions but the United
States Supreme Court has never explicitly passed on the issue.3
1) Constitutional Rights
The first amendment to the Constitution of the United States, insofar as
it respects religion, reads, "Congress shall make no law respecting an estab-
lishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercises thereof; . . . "I This
1 Married students' dormitories have been held to be "religious uses," Schueller v. Board
of Adjustment, 95 N.W.2d 731 (Iowa 1959); whereas it has been held that use of land for a
cemetery, even by a religious society, was not a "religious use," Appeal of Russian Orthodox
Church of the Holy Ghost of Ambridge, 397 Pa. 126, 152 A.2d 489 (1959).
2 "It should be noted, however, that certainly not all conceivable constitutional problems
had been solved." Savage, Land Planning and Democratic Purposes, 34 NoTRE DAME LAw.
65, 66 (1958).
3 Although the ordinance involved in Village of Euclid v. Amber Realty Co., 272 U. S.
365 (1926) upholding zoning as a proper exercise of the state police power, contained restric-
tions relating to churches, the Court found it unnecessary to consider the validity of these
provisions since there was no allegation that the plaintiff was damaged by them. Id. at 385.
The problem was presented again in Minney v. City of Azusa, 164 Cal. App.2d 12, 330 P.2d
255 (1958), but the appeal was dismissed for want of a federal question, 359 U. S. 436 (1959).
4 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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amendment is binding on the state courts through the fourteenth amendment5 of
the Constitution of the United States.
The latest zoning case decided on this issue is Congregation Temple Israel v.
City of Creve Coeur.6 In this decision the Supreme Court of Missouri held that an
enabling act, empowering the municipality to regulate the "location and use of
buildings, structures and land for trade, industry, residence or other purposes,"
7
granted no authority to prohibit the building of either churches or parochial schools
in residence districts. On motion for rehearing, which was denied, the court said:
we think that such a construction of this language to include the authority
to restrict or prohibit the use of land for religious or church purposes would
make it possible to interfere with the free exercise of religion protected by
the First and Fourteenth Amendments; and that this is a most persuasive
reason for holding this clause must not be broadened by implication to in-
dude these uses not specifically stated therein.8
This appears to be one of the few decisions resting on the first amendment freedom
of religion ground.9 The most common ground used by the courts in holding that
religious institutions may not be excluded from residential areas is that such ex-
clusion is not a valid exercise of the police power, since it has no reasonable rela-
tion to public health, safety, morals, or general welfare, and therefore constitutes
a deprivation of property without due process of law.'0 The proven weakness of
the due process ground rests in its vulnerability should the court feel that the ad-
ministrative body has not abused its discretion in excluding a particular religious
institution.'1 It has been intimated that it is merely a question of convenience
2
as to the ground on which this issue should be decided, but it is probably more
accurate to-say that the due process ground is too vague and that the freedom of
religion ground provides a more stable basis for legal argumentation. 3 In any
event, zoning and private restrictions are being used in an attempt to exclude re-
ligious institutions, if not directly, then indirectly. To this attempted exclusion, the
constitutional guarantee of freedom of religion may well be the answer.
5 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, provides: "No State shall make or enforce any law
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." The freedoms of the first
amendment are incorporated into the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. See:
Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U. S. 306 (1952); Kunz v. New York, 340 U. S. 290 (1951); Termi-
niello v. Chicago, 337 U. S. 1 (1949); Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Education, 333
U.S. 203 (1948); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940); Gitlow v. New York, 268
U. S. 652 (1925) (dictum); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); and Meyer v.
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
6 320 S.W.2d 451 (Mo. 1959).
7 Mo. RPv. STAT. § 89.020 (1949).
8 320 S.W.2d 451, 457 (Mo. 1959).
9 "Although the central issue in determining the validity of an ordinance excluding
churches from a zoned area would seem to be whether the restriction interferes with the first-
amendment guarantee of freedom of religion as incorporated in the fourteenth, none of the
decisions invalidating these ordinances has explicitly rested on this ground." Note, 70 I-Iv.
L. Rxv. 1428, 1436 (1957).
10 See, e.g., Diocese of Rochester v. Planning Bd., 1 N.Y.2d 508, 154 N.Y.S.2d 849, 136
N. E.2d 827 (1956); Brandeis School v. Village of Lawrence, 18 Misc.2d 550, 184 N.Y.S.2d
687 (1959).
11 Milwaukee Company of Jehovah's Witnesses v. Mullen, 330 P.2d 5 (Ore. 1958),
United States Supreme Court dismissed appeal and denied certiorari without comment
at 359 U.S. 436 (1959) ; West Hartford Methodist Church v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 143 Conn.
263, 121 A.2d 640 (1956).
12 See note, 23 BROOKLYN L. REV. 185, 192 (1957).
13 "By making use of the more concrete test provided by the first amendment provisions
concerning freedom of religion, rather than the vague criterion of due process, constitutional
privileges will be more readily assured and private religious organizations will realize the ne-
cessary guaranties for effective activity." Brindel, Zoning Out Religious Institutions, 32 NoTRn
DAME LAw. 627, 641 (1957),
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2) Uses Permitted
Classically, a master zoning ordinance establishes the basic uses permitted
within the particular zoned area. Usually such permitted uses are not exclusive
and the zoning act will also enumerate certain other uses which do not comply
with the ordinance but which nevertheless may be permitted. Although various
jurisdictions use different terminology when referring to such exceptions, they fall
within one of three catagories, and the attributes of each type are essentially the
same in all jurisdictions.
The first is the nonconforming use. This is a use of property that was in effect
prior to the enactment of the zoning ordinance. Although prohibited, it may be
permitted if the petitioner can show that it is not a menace to the health, welfare
and safety of the public.14 When a structure of a religious institution comes within
this category, even though it may be able to justify its present use on the above
ground, any application for permission to expand will be closely scrutinized, and
even though the particular board may grant permission, the application may be
denied upon judicial review. The New Jersey Court of Appeals did just this in
Ranney v. Instituto Pontificio Delle Maestre Filippini,15 even though there was a
showing on the part of the religious institution of hardship and also that the pro-
posed building site was unsuitable for construction of residences. It is noteworthy
however, that since the Ranney decision, the highest court in New Jersey has ruled
more favorably toward religious institutions. In Andrews v. Board of Adjustment"
the use of residential premises for a parochial school with living quarters for teach-
ers was permitted, although parochial schools were unauthorized in the residence
zone. The statute involved1 7 required two critical findings: (1) that the use can
be granted without substantial detriment to the public good and if such use would
not substantially impair the intent and purpose of the zoning ordinance; and, (2)
that special reasons exist for the use. Both of these findings were made by the
zoning board. As to the first requirement, the court reasoned that a school involves
no inherent detriment to the public good. The ordinance contemplated uses other
than one-family homes, i.e., apartment houses, garden apartments, apartment hotels,
hotels, boarding houses, churches, public schools and public playgrounds. The court
reasoned that the -use of premises as a parochial school was not dramatically different
from those envisioned in the zoning plan. As to the second requirement, a special
reason for the use existed. The education provided by a parochial school is an
accepted equivalent to public schooling and the need exists for both types, the
court reasoned, because of the swelling population. The New Jersey Andrews de-
cision is in line with the growing tendency to equate religious schools with public
schools for purposes of zoning.18
The second type of permission is the conditional use, which is sometimes re-
14 See generally, 2 METZENBAUM, LAW OF ZONING 1210-73 (2d ed. 1955).
15 20 N.J. 189, 119 A.2d 142 (1955).
16 30 N. J. 245, 152 A.2d 580 (1959). New Jersey, however, continues to frown upon ex-
pansion of nonconforming uses. See Mocco v. Job, 56 N. J. Super. 468, 153 A.2d 723 (1959).
17 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40:55-39 (Supp. 1958).
18 The Court of Appeals of New Jersey continues to permit the exclusion of churches. Al-
lendale Congregation of Jehovah's Witnesses v. Grasman, 30 N.J. 273, 152 A.2d 569 (1959),
held that an ordinance requiring that a building intended to be used as a church must provide
a usable space for off-street parking, to wit, space for one motor vehicle for every three seats
to be installed, did not abridge freedom of worship and was not invalid on its face. It is in-
teresting to note that in this case the municipality's conduct in increasing its general zoning
restrictions while the result of the pending application by the religious group for permission
to build was being awaited, was presumed to have been in good faith and for the public in-
terest and deemed lawfully controlling the pending application. For similar reasoning but a
different result see Redwood City Company of Jehovah's Witnesses v. City of Menlo Park, 167
Cal. App.2d 686, 335 P.2d 195 (1959). There the California Appellate Court held that when
the religious group complied with the off-street parking requirements, the refusal to grant a
permit to build a church was arbitrary and capricious, and a writ of mandate was granted to
compel the issuance of the building permit.
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ferred to by the general term "exception." A conditional use may be permitted
if it is shown that its existence is essential or desirable to the public convenience or
welfare, and that it will not impair the integrity and character of the zoned district.
It must be shown, therefore, that it is not detrimental to public health, public morals,
or public welfare. Since hardship is not a prerequisite to the issuance of a condi-
tional use permit, there is no burden on the applicant to show hardship of any
nature? 9
In Tustin Heights Ass'n v. Board of Supervisors," a Roman Catholic Arch-
bishop petitioned a county planning commission for a conditional use permit for
the establishment of a church and an elementary parochial school. After hearings,
the planning commission recommended denial of the application on the grounds
that (1) the site was not large enough to take care of the students under customary
state standards and also provide adequate parking space; and (2) that material
detrimezit or injury to the neighborhood would result from issuance of the permit.
In spite of the fact that the applicant proposed to amend the application by chang-
ing the location and the number of the access roads, the size, type, number and loca-
tion of the buildings, parking and playground area; and that the board of super-
visors authorized the issuance of the conditional permit on the basis of the proposed
amended application, the California Fourth District Court of Appeal held that
it was improper to construe the ordinance as permitting the board of supervisors
to grant a conditional use permit contrary to the recommendation of the planning
commission. In zoning cases in general, procedural defects are fatal, and this no
less applies to the applications of religious institutions. Nevertheless, the Tustin
Heights decision seems inconsistent with a prior decision 2l of the Supreme Court
of California, which declared unconstitutional 22 an ordinance that excluded private
schools from a district covering 98.7% of a municipality. The court in Tustin
Heights attempted to distinguish this important precedent by stating:
However, in that case [Roman Catholic Welfare Corp. v. City of Piedmont,
45 Cal.2d 325, 289 P.2d 438 (1955)] the ordinance prohibited only private
schools and the Supreme Court of California held such a restriction to be
discriminatory. The ordinance before us purports to restrict all schools and,
on its face, is not subject to the same criticism.
23
The distinction is shallow when one realizes that, as a matter of California law,
public schools cannot be excluded from residential districts by zoning ordinances2 4
because the state of California has occupied the field of public education. 25 The
court in Tustin Heights completely rejected the applicant's arguments of discrimi-
nation against religious schools and the denial of their equal protection of the law,20
19 See generally, YOICLEY, ZONING LAw AND PRACTICE §§ 131-33 (2d ed. 1953, Supp.
1958).
20 339 P.2d 914 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1959).
21 Roman Catholic Welfare Corp. v. City of Piedmont, 45 Cal.2d 325, 289 P.2d 438
(1955).
22 - Id. at 443. The court did not specify in what respect the ordinance was unconstitu-
tional, saying only that it was an arbitrary and unreasonable discrimination against private
schools.
23 Tustin Heights Ass'n v. Board of Supervisors, 339 P.2d 914, 922 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App.
1959).
24 Town of Atherton v. Superior Court, 159 Cal. App.2d 417, 324 P.2d 328 (1958), com-
mented upon in 47 CALIF. L. REv. 171 (1959).
25 Hall v. City of Taft, 47 Cal.2d 177, 302 P.2d 574 (1956).
26 See generally HoRAcK & NOLAN, LAND Usn CONTROLS § 7, at 111 (1955): "Sur-
prising as it seems, some communities attempt to exclude all schools-public, parochial, or
private. Equally unexpected is the practice of many communities to exclude schools from
single-family residence districts. Still other means have been used to reduce the burden of
schools on single-family residence districts. Public schools are permitted but parochial and
private schools are prohibited. To date, with few exceptions, the courts have found such ordi-
nances arbitrary and discriminatory." See also Note, 31 NOTRE DAME LAW. 113, 116 (1955):
Conceding that a per se difference does exist between public schools and
private schools, the writer nevertheless fails to detect in this distinction a
reasonable relation to the object sought by zoning ordinances. The effect
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notwithstanding the fact that the zoning ordinance enforced against them could
not have been enforced against public schools.
27
This most recent California view is not followed in New York. In Brandeis
School v. Village of Lawrence,28 the New York Supreme Court, Special Term, held
that an exclusion from a residential district of a private school performing the same
educational functions as a public school bears no substantial relation to public health,
safety, morals or general welfare, hence was a constitutionally invalid exercise of
the police power. The court reasoned that a zoning ordinance which excluded such
a school from a residential district violated due process notwithstanding that noise,
traffic congestion and attendant hazards to safety may result when such a school is
established and put into operation, and despite the fact that such conditions may be
expected to have a tendency to disrupt the peace and quiet of a residential neigh-
borhood and to cause a depreciation in property values.29 However, the New York
courts have excluded some private schools that were not religious in nature. In
Town of Hempstead v. Merrick Woods School, Inc.,30 day camps were enjoined
from operating in a residential zone in which day camps were prohibited. The
court reasoned that neither the equal protection clause nor the due process clause
of the state or federal constitutions gives private persons the right to operate a day
camp in an area zoned residential.2 ' Thus it appears that the New York courts con-
sistently permit an exception when the applicant is a religious institution, but have
ruled otherwise when the institution is privately owned and operated.
The third type of permissive use is known as the variance. When a variance
is sought, the constitutionality of the ordinance itself is not usually questioned. The
essential requirement for a variance is a showing that strict enforcement of the zoning
limitations would cause unnecessary hardship. The burden of showing such hard-
ship is on the applicant. If the variance is denied by the zoning board, upon judicial
review the applicant must show that the board acted arbitrarily and capriciously
of discriminating between two groups which are different merely in them-
selves, but who are similar in their status to given legislation, is to deny
them the equal protection of the laws.
27 Tustin Heights Ass'n v. Board of Supervisors, 339 P.2d 914, 922-23 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App.
1959).
28 184 N.Y.S.2d 687 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1959).
29 The New York court states:
This Court has heretofore expressed the view that in respect to the exer-
cise of the zoning power a distinction can validly be made between public
and private schools .... Those views were expressed before the Court of
Appeals in Diocese of Rochester v. Planning Bd. [1 N.Y.2d 508, 154
N.Y.S.2d 849, 136 N.E.2d 827 (1956)], announced its view to the con-
trary...
While it may be . . . that public and private schools have many character-
istics which distinguish them from one another organizationally, these differ-
ences are not of sufficient importance ... to justify different treatment in
a zoning ordinance.
The Court finds . . . in addition to providing its students with a secular
education which more than meets minimum requirements of the State Edu-
cational Department, [the religious institution] is furnishing simultaneously
a religious training for Jewish children which is comparable to that given
in parochial schools for Catholic children. The same reasons which the
Court of Appeals gave for permitting the establishment of a parochial school
in Diocese of Rochester v. Planning Bd .... apply with equal cogency here.
Brandeis School v. Village of Lawrence, 18 Misc.2d 550, 184 N.Y.S.2d 687,
696, 697-98 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1959).
30 177 N.Y.S.2d 81 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1958).
31 The New York court stated:
As for the Diocese of Rochester and similar cases, the accessory uses men-
tioned therein are different from the day camp situation in this case. The
accessory uses mentioned therein pertain to the year-round accessory use to
the primary, religious activities in those edifices and on those lands. 177
N.Y.S.2d 81, 84 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1958).
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in refusing to permit the variance,32 and the proof of this is difficult, even for re-
ligious institutions.
In City of Miami Beach v. Greater Miami Hebrew Acad.,s3 the Third District
Court of Appeal of Florida, reversing the Circuit Court for Dade County, held that
a refusal by the city council to change the zoning of a religious institution's lots so
as to permit construction and operation of a religious school thereon was not arbi-
trary or unreasonable, and that the chancellor of the lower court had no authority
to substitute his judgment for that of the city council. The-Florida court reasoned
that when one purchases land in the face of existing zoning restrictions, there is
no hardship, and any claimed hardship would be inactionable because self-imposed.
In Minney v. City of Azusa,2m the Second District Court of Appeal of California
held that there was no showing of an abuse of discretion in denying a variance to
permit the erection of a church in a residential area, even though there was an
allegation that the ordinance excluded churches from 90% of the area in a munici-
pality and the remaining locations were undesirable because of obnoxious fumes
and noise.3 5 When the religious institution in Minney appealed to the United States
Supreme Court, the appeal was dismissed for want of a properly presented federal
question.
3 6
Occasionally religious institutions attack a variance that has been issued to
build a business nearby over their protest. Then the burden is once again upon
the religious institutions, this time to prove that the issuance of the variance was
a violation of the zoning ordinance. In Russo v. Stevens,' 7 the New York Supreme
Court, Appellate Division, Third Department, held that a variance to build a gas
station across the street from a church was properly permitted in a business district
by the zoning board over the objection of a member of the Lay Committee of the
Catholic Church.
3) Restrictive Covenants
Restrictive covenants excluding religious institutions, although rarely litigated,
appear to be almost universally enforceable.3 8 Encumbering land with private re-
strictions has been characterized by some legal writers as a form of private zoning,
and usually may be evidenced in one of three forms: (1) on a plat; (2) in a deed
(to the lot to be conveyed or to some other lot in the subdivision); or (3) in a
separate document. Probably the chief enforcement difficulties are not the courts,
32 See generally, YoxLEy, op. cit. supra note 23, §§ 134-45 (2d ed. 1953, Supp. 1958).
33 108 So.2d 50 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1958).
34 164 Cal. App.2d 12, 330 P.2d 255 (1958).
35 The California court stated:
The pleading presents first the fundamental issue whether a zoning ordi-
nance can lawfully exclude churches from a residential district. This ques-
tion is settled in the affirmative so far as California law is concerned. 164
Cal. App.2d 12, 330 P.2d 255, 257 (1958).
It being established law that churches can be excluded legally from a resi-
dential zone and that they are subject to reasonable zoning regulations,
appellant [religious institution] stands, with respect to this claim of unrea-
sonable classification or discrimination on the face of the ordinance, in the
same position as any other litigant who raises that issue. In other words,
proposed use of property for religious purposes does not give it per se a
title to any particular zone; a church, like any other property owner, is to
be considered on its merits as fitting into the general scheme of a compre-
hensive zoning, entitled to no preference and subject to no adverse discrimi-
nation. 164 Cal. App.2d 12, 330 P.2d 255, 261 (1958).
36 359 U.S. 436 (1959).
37 7 App. Div.2d 575, 184 N.Y.S.2d 989 (1959) reversing 173 N.Y.S.2d 344 (Sup. Ct.
1958).
38 See: Buckleu v. Trustees Bayshore Baptist Church, 60 So.2d 182 (Fla. 1952); Housing
Authority of Gallatin County v. Church of God, 401 Ill. 100, 81 N. E.2d 500 (1948); West
Nichols Hills Presbyterian Church v. Folks, 276 P.2d 255 (Okla. 1954); Johnson v. Mt. Baker
Park Presbyterian Church, 113 Wash. 458,194 Pac. 536 (1920); Hall v. Church of the Open
Bible, 4 Wis.2d 246, 89 N.W.2d 798 (1958).
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but the inertia of subdivision residents and a general reluctance of subdividers to
go beyond the means of friendly persuasion. 9 Where the residents and subdividers
have resorted to the courts, they have been successful. In Hall v. Church of the
Open Bible,4 0 the Supreme Court of Wisconsin held that restrictive covenants pro-
viding that lots in a recorded plat could be used only for residential purposes4
gave no right to purchasers of a lot in that plat to erect a church and that they
could be enjoined from doing so. The Wisconsin court decided the question as a
matter of public policy and noted that there is a substantial difference between the
exclusion of churches by zoning ordinances as juxtaposed to restrictive covenants.
42
The decline of the power of public zoning to exclude religious institutions from
residential districts may force the residents to resort more frequently to private
restrictions.43
This survey shows that religious institutions can be and are being effectively
excluded from populated areas. The problem is one of balancing the interests be-
tween the residence owners asserted under the police power of the states, and the
religious institutions' constitutional guarantees of freedom of religion, due process
and equal protection. Contrary to the prediction of two years ago," ' churches and
church-related institutions have not had smooth sailing in this field. Petitions for
building permits, exceptions, variances and the like, have not always been greeted
favorably. There is considerable conflict among the decisions, but this conflict is in
part real and in part apparent because of the different factual situations. One thing
is certain, however, and that is that this is an area of Church-State relations in
which constitutional issues are no longer latent, but are being drawn out to preserve
and promote the conflicting interests.
B. SCHOOLS - Minimal Retreat from the Extreme of Establishment
The "free exercise" of religion by individual citizens continues to encounter
relatively little difficulty, but the problem of "establishment" is growing
apace - especially in the Catholic desire for public subsidy of parochial
schools (or the exemption of Catholic parents from public-school taxation)
and in the Protestant desire for public-school encouragement (and often
more than encouragement) of at least non-sectarian religious morality.
45
It goes without saying that the most important Supreme Court decisions con-
struing the "establishment" clause of the first amendment have been in the field
39 See Consigny & Zile, Use of Restrictive Covenants in a Rapidly Urbanizing Area, 1958
Wis. L. REV. 612.
40 4 Wis.2d 246, 89 N.W.2d 798 (1958).
41 The following is the restrictive covenant here involved:
No lot shall be used except for residential purposes. No building shall be
erected, altered, placed or permitted to remain on any lot other than one
detached single-family dwelling not to exceed two and one-half stories in
height and a private garage for not more than two cars. 4 Wis.2d 246, 89
N.W.2d 798, 799 (1958).
42 The court stated:
A basic reason for the difference which the law recognizes would seem to
be that zoning is a governmental action while restrictive covenants are
agreements between private individuals. There is nothing in the record to
show that there is any concerted movement in the city for the exclusion of
churches. Conceding the social value of churches, it is nevertheless true that
churches, like other places of assembly, produce noise, congestion and traf-
fic hazards. The exclusion of uses which create such conditions in an area
planned as residential cannot be said to be against public policy. Owners of
land in the plat have the right to impose such a restriction and the courts
will enforce it. 4 Wis.2d 246, 89 N.W.2d 798, 800 (1958).
43 See 55 MIcH. L. REV. 601, 603 (1957): "A municipality will find it exceedingly diffi-
cult . . . to exclude a church from a residential area, either by [a] zoning ordinance or [by]
decision of the zoning board." For an extended discussion of this aspect of the zoning ques-
tion, see Note, 70 HARv. L. REv. 1428 (1957).
44 Note, 33 NOTRE DAME LAW. 416, 420 (1957).
45 AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, 38th ANN. REP. 7 (1958).
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of education. A restatement of these cases is provided for a better and more thor-
ough presentation of the problem. In 1947, the Supreme Court, in Everson v. Board
of Education, held that a statute authorizing reimbursement of parents for expendi-
tures for bus transportation of their children to school, including Catholic parochial
schools, did not constitute an establishment, its purpose being merely to provide safe
transportation and thus protect the general welfare. In the course of its opinion
however, the Court for the first time spelled out the meaning and the implications
of the prohibition against an establishment of religion contained in the first amend-
ment. In a now famous dictum, Justice Black, speaking for the majority;" stated:
The "establishment of religion" clause of the First Amendment means at
least this: Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church.
Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one
religion over another. Neither can force nor influence a person to go to or
to remain away from church against his will or force him to profess a belief
or disbelief in any religion. No person can be punished for entertaining or
professing religious beliefs or disbeliefs, for church attendance or non-attend-
ance. No tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied to support any
religious activities or institutions, whatever they may be called, or whatever
form they may adopt to teach or practice religion. Neither a state nor the
Federal Government can, openly or secretly, participate in the affairs of any
religious organizations or groups and vice versa. In the words of Jefferson,
the clause against establishment of religion by law was intended to erect"a wall of separation between church and State." 48
The following year, in the case of McCollum v. Board of Education,49 the
Court relied on the above dictum to invalidate a released-time system under which
pupils, whose parents signed permission cards, were given periods of religious instruc-
tion on the public school premises during school hours by teachers employed by
religious organizations. Non-participating children attended a regular class or a
study hail during this released-time period. The majority5 refused to accept the
argument that the first amendment forbids only preference of one religion over
another and held that since public buildings were being used for religious instruc-
tion and the state's compulsory education system was in turn being used to help
provide for instruction carried on by the separate religious institutions, the program
was unconstitutional.
The most recent Supreme Court decision on this issue was Zorach v. Clauson,s1
which upheld the New York released-time system, 52 holding that the first amend-
ment did not require separation in every respect, the question in each case being
one of degree.5 3 This case emphasized the fact that we are a religious people whose
institutions presuppose a Supreme Being." The Court reasoned that to refuse to
accommodate the public service to their spiritual needs would be to prefer non-
believers over believers. It was pointed out that, since the children were released
for instruction outside the school, religious instruction in public schools was not
involved.55
The Zorach decision constitutes a retreat from both Everson and McCollum.
Where Everson's broad dictum, reaffirmed in McCollum, outlawed aid to all religi-
ous institutions, Zorach recognized that the government can, without constitutional
violation, accommodate all religious institutions.
46 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
47 Justices Jackson, Frankfurter, Rutledge, and Burton dissenting.
48 Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1947).
49 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
50 Justice Reed dissenting.
51 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
52 N.Y. EDUC. LAws § 3210 (1953). Other states having similar statutes are: California,
CAL. EDUC. Cona 1959 § 8201; Hawaii, HAWAII Rav. LAws § 40-15 (1955); Kentucky, Ky.
Rav. STAT. ANN. § 158.190 (1955); Maine, Ma. REv. STAT. ANN. ch. 41, § 146 (1954); Ore-
gon, ORE. RZv. STAT. § 336.260 (1957).
53 Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 314 (1952).
54 Id. at 313.
55 Id. at 314, Justices Black, Frankfurter, Jackson dissenting.
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The released-time issue is not dead. In Perry v. School District,6 a taxpayer
brought an action against the school district to have the released-time program in
public schools declared unconstitutional. The question was one of first impression
in Washington and the statutory authority to excuse a child for religious instruction,
though not explicitly granted, was construed to be granted.57 The Washington Su-
preme Court affirmed the lower court and upheld the constitutionality of the pro-
gram. However, the court modified its judgment by holding that the distribution
of information cards in public schlools, or the making of announcements or explana-
tions for the purpose of obtaining the parents' consent for their children's partici-
pation in the released time program, by representatives of religious groups or instruc-
tors in the schools, was in contravention of the state constitution.5"
Recently the members of the 1959 Wisconsin State Assembly requested the
opinion of the Wisconsin attorney general as to the constitutionality of a bill relating
to released time from public schools for religious instruction. His opinion, forwarded
to the State Assembly on June 24, 1959, was that the proposed bill did not violate
the United States Constitution (based on McCollum and Zorach), but he stated:
It is readily apparent that Wisconsin is in a minority position on the "re-
leased time" question. Most of the states approve it, even those that have
similar constitutional provisions to ours. The constitution means, for legal
purposes, what the Wisconsin Supreme Court says it means. Based on the
construction given these provisions by the Supreme Court and my predeces-
sors in office and for the reasons stated herein, I do not see how I could
come to any conclusion except that Bill 281, A., violates the Wisconsin
Constitution.
5 9
The Wisconsin attorney general's rationale even questioned the use of school facili-
ties by religious institutions for any religious purpose whatsoever. As a result, at
the time of this writing, there is no released-time statute in the state of Wisconsin.
Some states have not been quite so restrictive. In Florida, a school board of
trustees recently permitted several churches to use school buildings during Sunday
non-school hours. The authorization was for the temporary use of the buildings
pending completion of construction of church buildings. Some taxpayers objected
and instituted proceedings by which they sought an injunction against such use.
They took the traditional position that, by permitting the religious institutions to
use the school buildings, the school board was indirectly taking money from the
public treasury in aid of religious institutions, contrary to their constitutional rights.
It was their position that regardless of how small the amount of money might be,
nevertheless, if anything of value could have been traced from the public institution
to the religious institution, their constitutional rights had been thereby violated. The
56 344 P.2d 1036 (Wash. 1959).
57 WASH. REV. CODE § 28.27.010 (1952), states:
The superintendent of the schools of the district in which the child re-
sides, . . . , may excuse a child from such attendance if the child is phy-
sically or mentally unable to attend school, . . .or for any other sufficient
reason. (Emphasis added.)
58 WASH. CoNsT. art. 1, § 11, art. 9, § 4. The latter section provides that all public
supported schools "shall be forever free from sectarian control or influence."
59 Letter from John W. Reynolds to the Honorable Members of the 1959 Wisconsin State
Assembly, June 24, 1959. The attorney-general reasoned:
(a) A plan set forth in Bill 281, A., whereby pupils are released from school
for religious instruction outside the school and which utilizes the tax-estab-
lished and tax-supported public school system to aid religious groups to
spread their faith is in violation of sec. 18, Art. I, Wis. Const.
(b) There is grave doubt as to the validity of any released time plan that makes
use of a pupil's school time, whether off or on the school property, and
which makes use of school regulations to facilitate attendance for religious
instruction.
(c) There is doubt as to the validity of any released time plan where school au-
thorities cooperate to the extent of releasing the children for religious in-
struction if the children remain under the technical jurisdiction and dis-
cipline of the public school. Id. at 19.
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Florida Supreme Court held, in Southside Estates Baptist Church v. Board of
Trustees,0 that the action of the Board did not violate either Florida Laws or the
first amendment. In rejecting the above contentions, the court properly applied
the maxim De minimis non curat lex. The court stated that logic, as well as its
traditional attitudes toward the importance of religious worship, justified its align-
ment with other courts which permitted such use of their public schools. The court
stated:
We, therefore, hold that a Board of Trustees of a Florida School District
has the power to exercise a reasonable discretion to permit the use of school
buildings during non-school hours for any legal assembly which includes reli-
gious meetings, subject, of course, to judicial review should such discretion
be abused to the point that it could be construed as a contribution of public
funds in aid of a particular religious group or as the promotion or establish-
ment of a particular religion. 6l
The question of state financial support to religious educational institutions has
also been the subject of recent litigation in Vermont. A Vermont statute provided
in part that each town district shall maintain a high school or furnish secondary
instruction for its advanced pupils at a high school or academy to be selected by
the parents or guardians of the pupils. This statute also provided for the payment
of tuition by the local town district per pupil per school year as billed. 2 Under the
statute, public funds were being used by the South Burlington School Board to pay
tuition for pupils attending Catholic schools 6 3 The court enjoined these payments
and stated:
Here we have a direct conflict between sectarian education convenient to
the parents and guardians and paid by public tax moneys and the separation
of Church and State. The doctrine of separation must prevail. It is indeed
difficult to upset such a long standing practice nor is this practice being
upset lightly. The First Amendment has erected a wall between Church
and State. That wall must be kept high and impregnable. This court could
not approve the slightest breach. This practice has breached that wall.
64
This decision has not been popular 5 but Vermont's lieutenant governor, who is
expected to seek the governorship in the next election, said that he believed the
decision was "the only proper ruling,"6 6 and observed, "If the ruling is upheld it
will take the most patient and temperate kind of activity on the part of everyone
to find the proper solution to the problem." 67
A new issue is presented in the form of attempts to interject prayers into the
public schools and the closely kindred subject of Bible reading. Many states have
statutes requiring the Bible to be read in the public schools.68 The Supreme Court
has not yet ruled on this practice, " but the issue has been spotlighted by a three-
60 115 So.2d 697 (Fla. 1959).
61 Id. at 700-01.
62 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, § 793 (1958).
63 The Burlington Free Press, Feb. 20, 1960, p. 1, col. 4.
64 Swart v. South Burlington, Civil No. 1685 (Vt., Chittenden County Ct. Feb. 19, 1960).
65 Burlington Daily News, Feb. 29, 1960, p. 1, col. 1.
66 Vermont Sunday News, Feb. 21, 1960, p. 1, col. 8.
67 Ibid.
68 Alabama, ALA. CODE tit. 52, § 542 (1940); Delaware, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 14, § 4102
(1953); Georgia, GA. CODE § 32-705 (1933); Idaho, IDAHO CODE ANN. § 33-2705-07 (1947) ;
Kentucky, Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 158.170 (1955); Maine, ME. REV. STAT. ANN. ch. 41, §
145 (1954); New Jersey, N.J. REv. STAT. § 18:14-77 (1937); also provided for is the read-
ing of the Lord's Prayer, N.J. REv. STAT. § 18:14-78 (1937); Pennsylvania, PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 24, § 15-1516 (1950); Tennessee, TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-1307 (1955). Note: in the
above statutes, only Georgia and Kentucky provide for students to be excused with parent or
guardian permission. Some states merely provide that the Holy Scripture may be read in public
schools: Kansas, KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 72-1628 (Supp. 1957); North Dakota (at option
of teacher, but parent or guardian may excuse child), N.D. REv. CODE § 15-3812 (1943);
Oklahoma, OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70, § 11-1 (1941). Two states provide that the Bible shall
not be excluded from their public schools: Indiana, IND. ANN. STAT. § 28-5101 (1948); and
Iowa, IOWA CODE ANN. § 280.9 (1946).
69 Doremus v. Board of Education, 342 U.S. 429 (1952), dismissed for want of standing
on appeal from a judgment upholding reading of the Bible in New Jersey schools. See also,
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judge federal district court decision holding the Pennsylvania Bible reading statute'0
unconstitutional in Schempp v. School District.7 In Schempp, a Unitarian parent72
sought to enjoin enforcement of a state statute providing for the reading of ten
verses of the Holy Bible7 in the public school classrooms each day, without com-
ment. The American Civil Liberties Union sponsored the case74 and the American
Jewish Congress appeared as amicus curiae, filed a brief and participated in the
argument.7 5 In an ably written opinion by Judge Biggs, it was held that such a
reading constituted a religious ceremony and therefore the statute violated the
proscription of the first amendment to the federal constitution as applied to the states
by the fourteenth amendment. The court further held that the reading of ten verses
of the Bible without comment in conjunction with a mass recitation of the Lord's
Prayer also violated the first amendment. However, having passed on the consti-
tutional issues presented by the reading of ten verses of the Bible, and by the read-
ing of the Bible verses followed by the recital of the Lord's Prayer, the opinion
specifically noted that it did not reach the issue relating to a ceremony which consists
merely of the recital of prayer, such a case not having been before the court.76 It
is noteworthy that the Pennsylvania statute required attendance at school of every
child of school age77 and imposed criminal penalties on parents or other persons
in loco parentis for the child's non-attendance.78 The statute made no provision for
excusing the child during the reading of the Bible.79 The court undoubtedly felt
that this mandatory requirement put the children in the path of "compulsion,
[which] . . . , may be subtle and thus particularly effective in respect to chil-
dren ...... "80 Six other states have Bible reading statutes, embodying this apparently
fatal defect.8'
In New York, the sole issue of prayers in public schools was contested in
Gideons International v. Tudor, 14 N.J. 31, 100 A.2d 857 (1953), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 816
(1954), a New Jersey judgment holding unconstitutional the distribution of Gideon Bibles
through the schools. It may well be asked on the authority of Tudor, whether all Bible read-
ing is unconstitutional as a preference of one religion since sects in fact embrace diverse "offi-
cial" versions.
70 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 15-1516 (1950).
71 177 F. Supp. 398 (E.D. Pa. 1959).
72 Plaintiffs were Unitarians and one of the children testified that he did not believe in
the divinity of Christ, the Immaculate Conception, or the concepts of an anthropomorphic God
or the Trinity. All of these doctrines were read to him at one time or another during the
course of his instruction at the Abington High School.
73 The legislature of Pennsylvania did not define the term "Holy Bible" as do none of the
other state statutes. They do not, for example, make a differentiation between the King James
Version, frequently used by the Protestant churches, and the Douay version, which is author-
ized by the Roman Catholic Church, nor between the Old Testament and New Testament,
the latter an arena of doctrinal demarcation.
74 AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, 38th ANN. REP. 27 (1958).
75 N.Y. Times, Mar. 3, 1959, p. 14, col. 2.
76 177 F. Supp. 398, 404 (E.D. Pa. 1959):
It might also be argued with equal force that the compulsory recital of the
Lord's Prayer, solely, standing alone, constitutes an establishment of reli-
gion and a prohibiting of the free exercise thereof. But we do not and
cannot reach issues relating to a ceremony which consists of the recital of
the Lord's Prayer, Bible reading being omitted therefrom. Such a case is
not before us.
77 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 13-1327 (Supp. 1959).
78 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 13-1333 (1950).
79 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 15-1516 (1950).
80 Schempp v. School District, 177 F. Supp. 398, 406 (E.D. Pa. 1959).
81 Alabama, ALA. CODE tit. 52 § 542 (1940); Delaware, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 14, § 4102
(1953); Idaho, IDAHO CODE ANN. § 33-2705-07 (1947); Maine, ME. REV. STAT. ANN. ch. 41,
§ 145 (1954); New Jersey, N.J. REV. STAT. § 18:14-77, 78 (1937); and Tennessee, TENN.
CODE ANN. § 49-1307 (1955). Note that the Kansas and Oklahoma statutes merely provide
that the Bible may be read in public schools, but there is no provision for the child to be ex-
cused with parent or guardian permission, KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 72-1628 (Supp. 1957),
and OHLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70, § 11-1 (1941).
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Engel v. Vitale.82 In Engel, the taxpayers in the school district brought mandamus
proceedings to compel the Board of Education to discontinue the use in public
schools of the prayer "Almighty God, we acknowledge our dependence upon Thee,
and we beg Thy blessings upon us, our parents, our teachers, and our Country."
In a lengthy opinion by Justice Meyer, the Special Term held that the "establish-
ment" clause of the first amendment did not prohibit the noncompulsory saying of
prayer in the public schools, so long as the School Board takes affirmative steps to
protect the rights of those who, for whatever reason, choose not to participate in
the saying of the prayer.
Much of the furor has been in the area of bus transportation, school lunches,
textbooks on secular subjects, and health services.8 3 While religious institutions
generally favor separation of church and state in the educational arena,8 4 it has
also been observed that the state may have an obligation to aid these separate edu-
cational systems, and the national interest might be adversely affected if aid is not
forthcoming.8 5 The religious institutions have not expected or even greatly desired
basic institutional support (i.e., salaries and buildings), but incidental expenses such
as enumerated above have been another matter.s6 Rev. John A. O'Brien, recently
stated:
Regarding parochial schools, the Senator [John F. Kennedy] said: "as for
such fringe benefits as buses, lunches, and other services, the issue is pri-
marily social and economic and not religious. Each case must be judged
on its merits within the law as interpreted by the courts." Here many
Catholics would point out that the issue is not merely social and economic
since it involves justice and rights: justice to taxpayers and "equal protec-
tion under the law." Catholics have supreme confidence in the fairness of
both our courts and the general public in reaching just decisions on these
matters, once all the facts are understood.
8 7
Many communities have been debating this problem and have simultaneously
been subjected to pressures from withins s and without.8 9 In Squires v. City of
Augusta,90 the city of Augusta, Maine, passed a municipal ordinance and an order
providing for public bus transportation to children attending non-public schools.
Thirteen taxable inhabitants of the city sought to enjoin the city officials from carry-
ing into effect the provision of this ordinance. On May 25, 1959, the Supreme
Judicial Court, Kennebec County, held that in the absence of express authority
from the state legislature in the city charter or in a statute, the Augusta city council
had no authority to enact an ordinance of this type. The Maine legislature is now
considering public transportation for parochial school children,9 1 as some states
have already done.
92
82 191 N.Y.S.2d 453 (Sup. Ct. 1959).
83 For a general discussion of the problem, pointing out that such support is primarily a
service to the children and their parents and not a handout, see Kenealy, The Private School
and Public Law, 2 INSTITUTE OF C31URCH AND STATE 62, 79 (1959).
84 See HESBURGH, PATTERNS FOR EDUCATIONAL GROWTH 52 (1958), for a discussion of
some of the problems of parochial schools; see also RIESMAN, CONSTRAINT AND VARIETY IN
AMERICAN EDUCATION 57 (1958).
85 Last year's National Defense Education Act set up sorely needed programs for testing
and guidance in the public schools, but parochial schools were eliminated, Time, Dec. 7, 1959,
p. 62, col. 3; for a more perceptive analysis, see McCLUSKEY, CATHOLIC VIEWPOINT ON EDU-
CATION (1959).
86 For the European approach, which is a form of reimbursement to parents of children
attending private schools of taxes paid by them to support the public schools, see Commonweal,
Nov. 27, 1959, p. 255; For European Repercussions, see N.Y. Times, Dec. 25, 1959, p. 2, col.
2,3.
87 Look, Feb. 16, 1960, p. 20.
88 A citizens group called "Citizens for the Connecticut Constitution, Inc." was organized
to protest providing bus transportation to the school conducted by St. Rose's Roman Catholic
Church, after the municipality of Newtown, Conn., had approved same in a referendum:
N.Y. Times, Oct. 31, 1959, p. 25, col. 1.
89 N.Y. Times, Feb. 14, 1959, p. 2, col. 1.
90 155 Me. 151, 153 A.2d 80 (1959).
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There have been other miscellaneous issues that are difficult to catagorize and
that possibly reflect a distinctive change in the philosophy of some of the courts.
In the Village of Ossining, New York, a committee comprised of Catholics and
Protestants has, each year beginning with 1956, erected a Nativity scene on the lawn
of the local public high school. This was done with the permission of the Board of
Education and the project was financed by private subscription. The Supreme Court,
Westchester County, dismissed on the merits an action to enjoin the erection of
the Nativity scene.9 3 In so ruling, Justice Gallagher stated:
Much has been written in recent years concerning Thomas Jefferson's
reference in 1802 to "a wall of separation between Church and State." It
is upon that "wall" that plaintiffs seek to build their case. Jefferson's figure
of speech has received so much attention that one would almost think at
times that it is to be found somewhere in our Constitution. Courts and au-
thors have devoted numerous pages to its interpretation. This Court has no
intention of engaging in a dispute among historians as to the meaning of
a metaphor. The only language which we are called upon to interpret and
apply is the plain language quoted above from the Federal and State Consti-
tutions.
94
Absolute separation is not and has never been required by the Consti-
tution .... 95
By no process of legal reasoning could the permission granted to the
Creche Committee be construed as an establishment of religion or a denial of
the right to worship freely and without discrimination.96
Public school property is not then entirely off limits for religious observance, as long
as no public funds are expended thereon and there is no student compulsion involved
in the observance9
7
In another unusual case the Supreme Court of Oklahoma held, in State v.
Williamson,,s that the construction of a memorial chapel to be paid for by private
funds and to be used for assembly purposes, including nonsectarian, nondenomina-
tional religious worship, did not violate the first amendment to the federal consti-
tution or state constitutional provisions. Although the case dealt with the erection
of such a chapel at an orphanage, there is a strong suggestion that a similar plan
relating to a state school would be judicially condoned. Of course this case did
not require state funds ab initio and courts are usually reluctant to frustrate a private
gift to the state, but it does pose a nice problem of what separation of church and
state means. In its answer the court analogized to the chapel at West Point, which
is supported by government funds and is available for the cadets to attend. 9
Having analyzed what is happening in the area of religion in the educational
field, we have touched the heart of the "establishment" turmoil. Its importance to
us as individuals, and as a country, cannot be overestimated. What is to happen
can sometimes be foretold by perceiving trends in what is happening. Having ex-
amined the cases and the tempo of the times, the writers predict a continued ex-
clusion of religious influences in the public educational institutions, but on the
other hand, there appears to be a growing favoritism toward providing the usual
governmental services to the schools of the religious institutions. As to this latter
91 Time, Dec. 7, 1959, p. 62, col. 3.
92 State statutes providing for transportation of non-public school pupils: ALASKA COMP.
LAWS ANN. § 37-11-4,5 (Supp. 1958); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 122, § 29-7 (Smith-Hurd 1959);
LA. REV. STAT. § 17:158 (1951); Micir. CoMp. LAWS § 15.3366 (1959); MONT. REV. CODES
ANN. § 75-2003 (1947); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 189:9 (1955); and R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN.
§ 16-21-2 (1956).
93 Baer v. Kolmorgen, 14 Misc.2d 1015, 181 N.Y.S.2d 230 (Sup. Ct. 1959).
94 Id. at 237.
95 Id. at 239.
96 Ibid.
97 See also Southside Estates Baptist Church v. Board of Trustees, 115 So.2d 697 (Fla.
1959).
98 347 P.2d 204 (Okla. 1959).
99 Id. at 207.
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point, Harrop A. Freeman of the Cornell Law School has aptly drawn the con-
clusion:
Some believe that they see a pattern in the cases: that the strongly Catholic
states and judges uphold aid to parochial education. Although the cases
tend in this direction, I do not see therein the ratio decidendi. I believe
the courts have been trying to apply a difficult but valid test: If the aid is
directly to the "church" the use of public funds (property) is uniformly
held invalid; whereas, when the aid is a normal governmental service to its
citizens regardless of their religious affiliations the grants will be upheld.10
Perhaps, then the rationale should be a policy of non-discrimination in essential
school services rather than thinking of such as positive aid. This positive-negative
distinction may well be the key to the true understanding of the "establishment"
clause of the first amendment in the field of education. To proscribe establishment
is not to order discrimination. Equality of academic standards is generally de-
manded of all sectarian institutions and rightly so. It seems strangely incongruous,
then, to withhold services incidental to the general and equally convenient educa-
tion of all.
C. TAxATioN-A Cultural Quid Pro Quo
The Supreme Court has made a major judicial decision'0 ' on the matter of
tax exemption for religious institutions and property; and that was controlled by
considerations of a loyalty oath as a requirement for obtaining tax exemptions versus
freedom of speech. In striking down this portion of the law because it placed the
burden of proof on the applicant rather than on the state, the Court held that this
was a violation of due process. The Court invoked the rationale of Speiser v. Ran-
dall,20 2 decided the same day in reaching its conclusion. That case held the oath
provision as a step in the process of determining eligibility for the exemption un-
constitutional in that it casts the burden of proof on the applicant for the ex-
emption.'
0 3
The allocation of burden of proof was perceptively viewed as possibly outcome
determinative in the marginal areas of permissive speech,"' and "[w]here the
transcendant value of speech is involved, due process certainly requires . . . that
the State bear the burden of persuasion to show that the appellant engaged in
criminal speech."' 05
The majority opinion noted the appellant's contentions that the provisions
were "abridgments of religions freedom and . . . violations of the principle of
separation of church and state" but avoided any conclusion on these as necessary
since the Speiser rationale was dispositive of the case. 08 Only Justice Douglas ex-
pressed the opinion that the case ought to rest on the issue of religious freedom.
From the record it appeared that it was a stated principle of the church that the
state could not exact an oath of coerced affirmation as to church doctrine, advocacy
or beliefs. Justice Douglas summarizes: "There is no power in our government to
make one bend his religions scruples to the requirements of this tax law.'
0 7
100 Freeman, Exemptions From Civil Responsibility, 20 OHio Sr. L.J. 437, 440-41 (1959).
101 First Unitarian Church v. County of Los Angeles, 357 U. S. 545 (1958). Companion
case decided the same day, Valley Unitarian-Universalist Church, Inc. v. County of Los An-
geles. First Methodist Church v. Horstmann, 357 U.S. 568 (1958) relies on First Unitarian
as its basis of decision.
102 357 U.S. 513 (1958). Companion case: Prime v. City & County of San Francisco.
103 Not only does the initial burden of bringing forth proof of non-advocacy
rest on the taxpayer, but throughout the judicial and administrative pro-
ceedings the burden lies on the taxpayer of persuading the assessor, or the
court, that he falls outside the claim denied the tax exemption. Id. -at 522.
104 Id. at 525-6.
105 Id. at 526.
106 First Unitarian Church v. County of Los Angeles 357 U. S. 545, 547 (1958).
107 Id. at 547, 548.
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After this decision the California legislature repassed the tax exemption bill
without the provision requiring the loyalty oath. 08 It seems that this tax exemption,
especially for private and parochial schools, has had trouble before in California;"'9
but it appears to have weathered the storm, for a while at least, with the defeat
of proposition 16310
A very interesting case was recently decided by the Montana Supreme Court.2"'
A church society organized on a communal living basis claimed exemption from
the Montana corporation and association license tax as a religious society. The
exemption was denied despite reliance of the society on first amendment freedom
of religion guarantees. The agricultural activities of the community, which sustained
the socialized living services, were held purely commercial in nature and divorced
from any possible religious beliefs of the members. As such, these activities were
subject to the corporate privilege tax. The court used a common test in comparing
the questioned activities to similar activities of purely commercial groups, discerning
thereby similarity and competitive aspects. Another issue in this area is the determi-
nation of whether a particular piece of property lies within the definition of the
state Constitution 12 and/or statute granting the exemption.
In understanding the cases on the matter of tax exemption it is imperative
that they be read in the light of the peculiar terms of the statute or Constitutional
provision under which they arise. In Nebraska, under a statute'"s which provides
that the property must be owned and used exclusively for religious purposes without
profit to the owner or user, the court held that property owned by a religious group
is exempt from taxation where it, and the income from it, is used exclusively for
carrying out its educational work."14 It is the ultimate use of the property and not
the status of the owner which was here determinative of the taxability of the prop-
erty. In Oregon, exclusive use was the statutorily imposed test applied to property
owned by the institution (whether religious, charitable, scientific, etc.). In Mult-
nomah, 5 it was held that a tax exemption was applicable even to the house where
a janitor and the superintendent of the dining hall lived.
The phrase "exclusively used" has reference to the primary and incidental
use . . . when the primary purpose is an exempt one, any incidental use
of the exempt property for another purpose does not negative the exemption
when the incidental use is not for profit."16
It is enough if the facility is incidental to the prime purposes of the institution and
is reasonably necessary to the accomplishment of that purpose."17 Yet in the same
case, the court denied an exemption to a book store owned by the same institution
108 N.Y. Times, Feb. 26, 1959, p. 19, col. 3.
109 N.Y. Times, Feb. 16, 1958, p. 63, col. 3. The voters were asked to adopt a constitutional
amendment (proposition 16) which would repeal the tax exemption. This was supported by
the Masons and some Protestant leaders and opposed by Catholics, Seventh Day Adventists,
Lutherans and Episcopalians. There was added interest in the controversy as when the amend-
ment granting exemption had been adopted in 1952, those favoring the exemption had only a
77,000 vote majority out of 5,000,000 votes cast.
110 N.Y. Times, Nov. 6, 1958, p. 22, col. 3.
111 State v. King Colony Ranch, 28 U.S.L. WEErK 2474, Mont. Sup. Ct., Mar. 17, 1960.
112 Only Kentucky, Louisiana, and New Mexico have constitutional provisions alone with-
out statutes to back them up.
113 NEB. REv. STAT. § 77-202 (1958).
114 Nebraska Conference Ass'n of Seventh Day Adventists v. County of Hall, 166 Neb. 588,
90 N.W.2d 50 (1958).
115 Multnomah School of the Bible v. Multnomah County, -- Ore.-, 343 P.2d 893 (1959).
Here the exemption was granted under Ore. Rev. Stat. § 307-130 (1957) which provides for
exemptions to literary, benevolent, charitable and scientific institutions, rather than under the
section granting exemptions to religious institutions (§ 307.140); however the two sections are
otherwise comparable. Therefore the same reasoning will probably apply to exemptions for
religious institutions. The institution involved was a nondenominational liberal arts school
emphasizing the study of the Bible.
116 Id. at 898.
117 See also 166 Neb. 588, 90 N.W.2d 50, 57 (1958); (discussion of case where the House
of the Good Shepherd operated a laundry for profit).
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because it was run for profit, even though all the money was turned over for the
use of the school, a formalistic distinction not respected in the Seventh Day Adventist
case (supra). Similarly in Gull Lake,""" the court granted a tax exemption to land
used by the conference for running its Bible schools, under the charitable rather
than religious exemption, even though rent was charged of those who used the
facilities of the conference.
The charges made for such services and facilities approximate the cost thereof
to plaintiff, and the income derived therefrom should and does not, in the
opinion of this Court, detract from the charitable character of the plaintiff
organization."29
The pertinent statutes in the latter two states are not significantly different,' 20 yet
the Gull Lake case seems preferable because the use to which the money is put
ought to be determinative; there should be no penalty for attempting to defray the
expenses in running the charity or religious institution.
The same reasoning was used in a Pennsylvania case 2 1 where the lower court
said that it is the actual use which is to determine whether a parking lot is tax
exempt when the statute says that an exemption is to be given to "all churches,
meeting-houses, or other regular places of stated worship, with the ground thereto
annexed necessary for the occupancy and enjoyment of the same." 22 The lower
court buttressed its decision by mentioning the distance from the Church which
many of the members live, the indispensability of the automobile and the traffic
problem created by parking in the street. However, the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court reversed 23 since the Pennsylvania constitution allowed exemption only for
"actual places of religious worship."'2 4 Thus, "the exemption of Church property
is constitutionally restricted, as educational and charitable property is not, to the
actual place of worship."'2 5 The decision seems highly unrealistic in view of the
fact that those who drafted the constitutional provision could hardly have contem-
plated parking lots, plus the fact that a subsequent legislative enactment exempted
places of worship "with the ground thereto annexed necessary for the occupancy
and enjoyment of the same."'M2 The court chose to construe "necessary" very nar-
rowly in light of the constitutional provision.
Courts have generally limited the favorable treatment accorded religious insti-
tutions in the tax exemption field to cases where the rationale of quid pro quo with
society at large is applicable. Exemption from other general laws seldom clears the
hurdle of the ban against discriminatory legislation. Thus, in a Kansas case'27
the court struck down a municipal ordinance which forbade door to door selling
but made an exception as to religious, charitable or community service organizations.
Where an ordinance imposes penalties, it cannot make a particular act penal
when done by one person and impose no penalty for the same act done
under like circumstances by another.'
28
There is no reasonable ground upon which the classification can be made.
118 Gull Lake Bible Conference Ass'n v. Township of Ross, 351 Mich. 269, 88 N.W.2d 264
(1958).
119 Id. at 267.
120 Micr. ComP. L. 211.7 (1948) "such real estate as shall be owned and occupied by
... charitable . .. institutions ... while occupied by them solely for the purposes for which
they were incorporated"; ORE. REv. STAT. § 307.130 (1957) "only such real or personal pro-
perty, or proportions thereof, as is actually and exclusively occupied or used in ... charitable
... work carried on by such institutions."
121 In re Second Church of Christ Scientist v. City of Philadelphia, 189 Pa. Super. 579,
151 A.2d 860 (1959). Cases therein cited indicate, however, that the exemptions allowed in
Seventh Day Adventists, Multnomah, and Gull Lake would not have been allowed by the
Pennsylvania Court.
122 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72 § 5020-204(a) (1950).
123 Second Church of Christ Scientist v. City of Philadelphia, 157 A.2d 54 (Pa. 1959).
124 PA. CONST., art. IX, § 1.
125 157 A.2d 54, 55 (Pa. 1959).
126 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 5020-204(a) (1950).
127 City of Derby v. Hiegert, 183 Kan. 68, 325 P.2d 35 (1958).
128 Id. at 37, citing 5 MCQUILLON, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 18.11 (3d ed., 1949).
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It bears no relation to the object and purposes of the ordinance. Its only
effect is to permit one class to violate the provisions of the penal ordinance
without penalty and to hold another class strictly responsible thereto.
1 29
The field of tax exemption for religious institutionsI30 does not seem to be
too controversial of late. The test for determining if property will be exempted
seems to be the use to which it is put, but the loss of the exemption for income
producing property which is exclusively for the use of the religious institution seems
to be a distinction which bears little relation to the purposes of the exemption - to
remove the burden of taxes from those institutions which are considered to be
performing an actual public service. No great injustice is done by this distinction
but likewise no great harm would be done by its abolishment. This area, then,
seems to be the one major area in which the state is constitutionally able to give
aid to religion (although not solely to a certain denomination or denominations).
It is an element of institutional recognition traditional in our society and is latent
precedent that such can exist.
D. TORT LIABLiTY -Emerging Realism
The question of immunity of religious institutions from tort liability is but one
facet of the broader problem of immunity of charitable institutions from tort liability.
It is beyond the scope of this survey to analyze the entire field of charitable immunity
and the legal changes which have taken place within that area since the decision in
President and Directors of Georgetown College v. Hughes.l- Although the majority
of the courts have made little, if any, distinction between a religious charitable
institution and other types of charitable institutions,"12 some courts have discussed
religious factors in cases involving charitable immunity. A few of these cases de-
serve comment.
In Casey v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Baltimore"'3 plaintiff slipped and
fell on a waxed aisle of a dimly lit church and sustained serious injury. A cross ap-
peal was filed by plaintiff on the ground that the trial judge erred in not allowing
certain questions concerning religious prejudice to be asked of the jury during voir
dire. The court, in reversing and remanding, stated:
[I]f the religious affiliation of a juror might reasonably prevent him from
arriving at a fair and impartial verdict in a particular case because of the
nature of the case, the parties are entitled to . . . have the court discover
for them, the existence of bias or prejudice resulting from such affiliation. ...
[A] party is entitled to a jury free of all disqualifying bias or prejudice with-
out exception, and not merely a jury free of bias or prejudice of a general
or abstract nature."
4
With the recognition by the court that some jurors might hesitate to render an
award against a religious institution, and the granting of the opportunity to disclose
such hesitancy during voir dire, religious institutions are properly placed on the
same footing as any other litigant.
New Jersey recently discarded the doctrine of immunity in regard to religious
institutions.'" Having discarded charitable immunity earlier the same day"36 and
129 Id. at 37.
130 See generally, Van Alstyne, Tax Exemption of Church Property, 20 OxIo ST. L. J. 461
(1959).
131 130 F.2d 810 (D.C. Cir. 1942). For an excellent discussion of the broad area of char-
itable immunity, see Collopy v. Newark Eye and Ear Infirmary, 27 N.J. 29, 141 A.2d 276
(1958).
132 See, e.g., Knecht v. Saint Mary's Hospital, 392 Pa. 75, 140 A.2d 30 (1958) (immunity
upheld; no discussion of religious character of institution). Compare Dalton v. St. Luke's
Catholic Church, 27 N.J. 22, 141 A.2d 273 (1958) (tort immunity discarded; religious affilia-
tion not discussed) with McDermott v. Saint Mary's Hospital Corp., 144 Conn. 417, 133 A.2d
608 (1957) (immunity doctrine upheld; religious character of institution not discussed).
133 217 Md. 595, 143 A.2d 627 (1958).
134 Id. at 632.
135 Dalton v. St. Luke's Catholic Church, 27 N.J. 22, 141 A.2d 273 (1958).
136 Collopy v. Newark Eye and Ear Infirmary, 27 N.J. 29, 141 A.2d 276 (1958).
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finding no reasonable grounds on which to distinguish between a religious institution
and other types of charitable institutions 37 the New Jersey court joined the in-
creasing number of states that have discarded the immunity of eleemosynary in-
stitutions.P s
In a recent Minnesota case, Mulligan v. Saint Louis Churchu 9 plain-
tiff, having descended the church steps, was standing on the public sidewalk
when she was knocked down by another parishioner who had tripped over a mat
lying on the church steps. In sustaining a recovery for plaintiff, the court stated
that as the relation between the church and plaintiff had ceased, plaintiff was in
the same relationship to the church as any other pedestrian who passes the premises
on a public walk. 40 This decision places a church in the same status as any other
charitable institution; the relationship of church and church-goer, just as the status
of licensee, terminates when the person leaves the premises.' 4"
Where a statutory duty is involved, the courts have not hesitated to impose
liability on religious institutions ' 2 However, where no statutory duty exists, a few
states have persisted in upholding the immunity of religious institutions. This has
been done on the grounds that if immunity is to be abrogated, it is a task for the
legislature 43 or that public policy requires that religious institutions be immune
from tort liability in order to prevent depletion of their charitable funds."4"'
Two states have reached conflicting results in applying the doctrine of re-
spondeat superior to religious institutions. The Washington Supreme Court upheld
the immunity of religious organizations where a gratuitous service was rendered 4 5
while th& California Supreme Court saw no reason for distinguishing between re-
137 Id. at 274.
138 See, e.g., Wheat v. Idaho Falls Latter Day Saints Hospital, 78 Idaho 60, 297 P.2d 1041
(1956); Haynes v. Presbyterian Hospital Ass'n, 241 Iowa 1269, 45 N.W.2d 151 (1950);
Roland v. Catholic Archdiocese, 301 S.W.2d 57.4 (Ky. 1957) (no immunity where statutory
duty exists); Foster v. Roman Catholic Diocese, 116 Vt. 124, 70 A.2d 230 (1950).
Contra, McDermott v. St. Mary's Hospital Corp., 144 Conn. 417, 133 A.2d 608 (1957);
Landgraves v. Emanuel Lutheran Charity Board, 203 Ore. 489, 280 P.2d 301 (1955); Penaloza
v. Baptist Memorial Hospital, 304 S.W.2d 203 (Tex. 1957).
139 95 N.W.2d 1 (Minn. 1959).
140 Cf. Fandel v. Parish of St. John The Evangelist, 225 Minn. 77, 29 N.W.2d 817 (1947).
Some cases have involved the recognition that the injured party was not an invitee on church
premises but merely a licensee since a beneficiary of the religious activity involved. Springer
v. Federated Church, 71 Nev. 177, 283 P.2d 1071 (1955); Coalbaugh v. St. Peter's Roman
Catholic Church, 142 Conn. 536, 115 A.2d 662 (1955). An interesting case is Manning v.
Noa, 345 Mich. 130, 76 N.W.2d 75 (1956) where plaintiff, injured on church property while
leaving premises after having played bingo, was allowed to recover over the objection that her
participation in an unlawful act, viz: bingo, barred her from recovery.
141 No immunity for religious institutions exists in Minnesota. Geiger v. Simpson Methodist-
Episcopal Church, 174 Minn. 389, 219 N.W. 463 (1928).
142 McQueeney v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 21 Ill. App. 2d 553, 159 N.E.2d 43 (1959)
(church failed to provide handrails as required by city ordinance; no immunity from liability).
According to the Illinois rule, Moore v. Moyle, 405 Ill. 555, 92 N. E.2d 81 (1950), immunity
for charitable institutions is limited to the trust funds necessary for the charity, but where
these funds will not be diverted because of adequate insurance coverage, the normal rules of
liability are imposed. In this case there is no discussion of insurance coverage. The case may
turn upon either the statutorily imposed liability or the existence of insurance. Watry v. Car-
melite Sisters, 274 Wis. 415, 80 N.W.2d 397 (1957) (WIs. STAT. § 101.06 (1955) applies to
religious organizations in its requirement that public buildings be maintained in a safe condi-
tion). Compare Roland v. Catholic Archdiocese, 301 S.W.2d 574 (Ky. 1957) with St. Wal-
burg Monastery of Benedictine Sisters v. Feltner's Adm'r, 275 S.W.2d 784 (Ky., 1955).
143 Landgraver v. Emmanuel Lutheran Charity Bd., 203 Ore. 489, 280 P.2d 301 (1955).
144 Baptist Memorial Hospital v. McTighe, 303 S.W.2d 446 (Tex. 1957). Cf. Steele v. St.
Joseph's Hospital, 60 S.W.2d 1083 (Tex. 1933) (no immunity where there is negligence in
hiring or keeping employee whose negligence causes injury).
145 Lyon v. Tumwater Evangelical Free Church, 47 Wash. 2d 212, 287 P.2d 128 (1955)
criticized in Comment, Questionable Status of the Charitable Immunity, 31 WAsr. L. RBv.
287 (1956).
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ligious institutions and charitable institutions and held the religious institution
liable.
146
One state has drawn a distinction between a charitable hospital and a religious
group. While holding a charitable hospital liable because of increased insurance
coverage 47 a religious group was granted immunity from tort liability in Hunsche
v. Alter.14  This immunity doctrine was subsequently extended and upheld in
Tomasello v. Hoban:'49 The rationale behind both decisions is stated in Hunsche
v. Alter:
This changed situation [increased insurance coverage] has required a change
in public policy with respect to charity hospitals and has prompted the
courts of a number of states (including Ohio) to reconsider the question
of tort immunity for such institutions. No such change has occurred, how-
ever, in the operation of nonprofit religious organizations and the reasons
which prompted the courts to grant partial immunity to them on the basis
of sound public policy in the past still exist. 15 0
Lack of adequate liability insurance coverage by religious institutions is apparently
the sole basis for the two Ohio decisions. In neither case did the Ohio court base
its decision on facts and figures concerning insurance coverage of religious institu-
tions. If, in fact, insurance coverage is lacking for some religious institutions, the
Ohio court's distinction may be sound. However, there are certain activities of
religious institutions which call for the same legal liability as is imposed on non-
religious associations.' Lack of adequate insurance coverage should not be a bar
to recovery in those situations. But where the activity of a religious association could
be considered primarily of a religious nature, the lack of insurance coverage may
be sufficient justification for allowing immunity for religious associations from tort
liability.
E. INSTITUTIONAL RESISTANCE TO EXISTING LAw-Church Gambling
If the thesis may be established that the law often denies to religious institu-
tions and values the recognition that should be accorded them in our modern
pluralistic society, then it must be admitted that at least one area exists where the
antithetical situation is apparent. Such is the problem of institutionalized violation
of anti-gambling legislation.
While twelve states of this country permit certain specified types of lotteries
for the benefit of charitable or religious organizations, 152 the remaining states make
no such exceptions to their blanket prohibitions against gambling. 53 Thus, in thirty-
146 Malloy v. Fong, 37 Cal. 2d 356, 232 P.2d 241 (1951). Both England v. Hospital of
the Good Samaritan, 14 Cal. 2d 791, 97 P.2d 813 (1939), and Silva v. Providence Hospital,
14 Cal. 2d 762, 97 P.2d 798 (1939) discarded the doctrine of charitable immunity and this
holding was extended to apply to Malloy v. Fong, supra.
147 Avellone v. St. John's Hospital, 165 Ohio St. 467, 135 N.E.2d 410 (1956).
148 145 N.E.2d 368 (C.P. Ohio 1957). No such distinction has been drawn by other
courts. See, e.g., Parks v. Holy Angels Church, 160 Neb. 299, 70 N.W.2d 97 (1955) utilizing
Muller v. Nebraska Methodist Hospital, 160 Neb. 279, 70 N.W.2d 86 (1955) (immunity up-
held).
149 155 N.E.2d 83 (C. P. Ohio 1958).
150 145 N.E.2d 368, 369 (C. P. Ohio 1957). Cf. Avellone v. St. John's Hospital, 165 Ohio
St. 467, 135 N.E.2d 410 (1956) (immunity of charitable hospitals discarded).
151 See, e.g., Roland v. Catholic Archdiocese, 301 S.W.2d 574 (Ky. 1957). (Violation of
statute in regard to income-producing rental property resulting in injury to stranger to charity.)
152 CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. §§ 7-169-7-186 (1958) (Bingo, Raffles, and Bazaars); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 28, §§ 1101-1156 (1957 Supp.) (Bingo); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. CI. 139, § 21
et. seq. (1954) (Beano); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, §§ 247-64 (1957) (Bazaars permitted in
some counties only); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 614.054 (1947) (Bingo); N. H. REv. STAT. ANN.
§§ 287.1-287-10 (1955) (Beano); N. J. REv. STAT. 5:8-1-5:8-7 (1959) (Bingo and Raf-
fles; N. M. STAT. ANN. 40-22-18 (1953) (Lotteries) N.Y. MUNIC. §§ 475-99 (Bingo); OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 295.12 (Page 1954) (Charitable games of chance); R. I. GEN. LAWS ANN.
11-19-30 (1956) (Bingo); Wyo. Comp. STAT. ANN. § 6-213 (1945) (Raffles only).
153 ALA. CODE tit. 14, § 275 (1940); ALASKA COmp. LAWS ANN. §§ 65-13-1--65-13-6
(1949); ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-435, 13-436 (1956); ARK. STAT. §§ 41-2018-
41-2025 (1947); CALIF. PEN. CODE § 319-26; COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 40-16-1-40-16-17
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eight states of the country, the familiar parish bingo games or the church raffles
are run in contravention of the law. These games are almost always sponsored by
Catholic Church groups' u and in many cases are major sources of income.5 5 To
be sure, attempts are seldom made to prosecute these groups for violating the anti-
lottery laws,' 56 however, prosecutions are brought against non-church and non-
charitable lotteries.' 57
While there are really no legal problems raised by church gambling - for
such lotteries clearly violate the law 53 - this practice on the part of church groups
does pose a number of moral problems worthy of consideration -in determining
whether any possible justification exists for such wholesale violation.
Ecclesiastical law is somewhat unclear on the specific point of gambling,5
and, since parish bingo games are aimed at lay participation, the canon law directed
against clerical gambling would not seem to have any bearing on the problem. 60
However, it is an express tenet of canon law that the church has the right to
acquire property by all the just means of the natural law and of the positive law
by which others may acquire property.' 6' It would seem clear, then, that canon
(1953); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 849.09 (1949); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 26-6501-26-6508 (1953);
HAWAII REV. LAWS §§ 288-1-288-19 (1955); IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 18-4901-18-4909 (1947);
ILL. ANN. STAT. Ch. 38 §§ 406,408 (Smith-Hurd 1935); IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 10-2301-10-2303
(1956; IOWA CODE ANN. § 726.8 (1950); KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 21-1501-21-1506 (1959);
KY. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 436.360-436.430 (1955); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14.90 (1951); MAss.
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 271, § 7 (1956); MICH. CoMP. LAWS §§ 750.372-750-376 (1948);
Miss. CODE ANN. § 2270 (1942); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 563.430 (1952); MONT. REV. CODES
ANN. §§ 94-3001-94-3011 (1947); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 28-961-28-963 (1943); NEV. REv.
STAT. §§ 462.010-462-080 (1959); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 14-289-14.292 (1953); N.D. REV.
CODE §§ 12.2401-12-2407 (1943) ; OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21 §§ 1051-1068 (1958); ORE. REV.
STAT. §§ 167.405-167.430 (1954); PA. STAT. ANN. fit. 18 § 4601 (1945); S. C. CODE §§
§§ 39-2017-29-2019 (1956); TEx. PEN. CODE Art. 619-21 (1948); UTAH CODE ANN.
76-27-9-76-27-10 (1953); VT. STAT. ANN. fit. 13, §§ 2101-2103 (1958); VA. CODE ANN.
§§ 18-301-18-303 (1950); WASH. REV. CODE §§ 959.010-959.050 (1952); W. VA. CODE
ANN. § 6104 (1955); Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 945.01-945.02 (1958).
154 All major Jewish groups are opposed to gambling as a means of fund raising. N.Y.
Times, Nov. 19, 1959, p. 25, col. 3. In addition almost all Protestant denominations are op-
posed to church gambling. N.Y. Times, Oct. 12, 1954, p. 52, col. 3.
155 A few random articles from the N.Y. Times show the size of the profits realized by
some churches. Thus one New Jersey parish and its Holy Name Society grossed over $200,000
in less than one year from Bingo games. N.Y. Times, Dec. 30, 1955, p. 21, col. 5. One Brook-
lyn parish was reported to draw 3,000 people to a weekly Bingo game. The participants paid
a $3 admission to this "party." N.Y. Times, Sept. 24, 1955, p. 32, col. 5. The pastor of a
church in Rockaway Beach reported that 80% of the Church's revenue was derived from Bingo
games, N.Y. Times, Feb. 14, 1955, p. 21, col. 3.
156 In September, 1954, Deputy Inspector Goldberg of the N.Y. Police Department was
dismissed for enforcing the New York lottery laws against several church and fraternal organi-
zations in Brooklyn. N.Y. Times, Sept. 10, 1954, p. 1, col. 8. In December, 1954, a national
furor in the Catholic Press was raised over the attempted prosecution of two nuns in California
for violating the California Gambling laws. 1 CATHOLIC LAw 74 (1955).
157 The Decennial Report for 1959 shows 42 lottery convictions. None of these involved
church organizations. This fact is sometimes used by church groups to argue that the laws do
not apply to them because of disuse. However, it should be noted that desuetude is not gen-
erally a principle of our jurisprudence. See 64 -Axv. L. REv. 1181 (1951). Beyond this, af-
fairs like the Goldberg incident (see note 156 supra) have undoubtedly made many public offi-
cials fearful of enforcing these laws.
158 When it has suited their purposes, Church lawyers attempted to hide behind the ille-
gality of church gambling. Thus in one case where a woman was suing for personal injuries
suffered as she was leaving a parish bingo game, the church defended on the ground that the
woman was herself a wrongdoer. Manning v. Noa, 345 Mich. 130, 76 N.W.2d 75 (1956).
See also Hardy v. St. Matthew's Community Center, 240 S.W.2d 95 (Ky. 1951).
159 For a general history of the Canon Law in relation to gambling see 6 CATHOLIC ENCY-
CLOPEDIA 367 (1909).
160 Clerical gambling is regulated by Canon 138, CODEX JURIS CANONICI. In addition, in
this country, the Second Plenary Council of Baltimore forbade illegal clerical gambling. (Acta,
no. 154).
161 Ecclesia acquirere bona temporalis potest omnibus justis modis juris sive naturalis, sive
positive, quibus idalis licet. CODEX IURIS CANONICI, Can. 1499 § 1.
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law adopts the positive civil law as a negative norm to govern the acquisition of
property.16 2 Viewed in this light, it is difficult to imagine any religious justification
for the gathering of funds through illegal means.
Even if canon law permits the Church to raise funds through illegal gambling
activities there would still seem to be moral objections to this willful disobedience
of lawful authority. For the Christian, legitimate civil authority must be respected
not only as an attribute of his government, but as being in its ultimate derivation
divine: "Let everyone be subject to the higher authorities, for there exists no author-
ity except from God, and those who exist have been appointed by God.'
6 3
Not only are these laws against gambling to be respected as enactments of
legitimate civil authorities, but it seems to be the opinion of moralists that "such
laws are just and useful, inasmuch as they serve to keep within the bounds of de-
cency the dangerous habit of gambling and the many evils which are usually as-
sociated with it."'16
The difficulty in this area is not with the general principles but rather with
deciding to what extent one is morally obliged to obey the laws against gambling.
A different conclusion may result depending on whether or not one accepts the
"purely penal law" theory. According to this theory there are some laws which
are purely penal, that is, they do not oblige the doing or not doing of the act speci-
fied. They merely assess a penalty for the violation of the law, which penalty one
is morally obliged to accept if one is convicted. 165 A number of moralists have
argued that the anti-gambling laws are themselves purely penal and that one is
not morally obliged to obey them.166 The difficulty is that one is morally obliged
to accept the penalty which is assessed for the violation of a purely penal law. Yet
the loud and angry protests at the attempted enforcement of these laws indicate
that many church members are unwilling to even accept the penalty for the breach-
of these laws.
6 7
Opposed to the purely penal law school of moralists is arrayed a school of
thinkers, beginning with St. Thomas Aquinas, 68 who maintain that there is no
such thing as a purely penal law. As one modern writer has argued:
The opinion according to which certain laws do not bind to the accom-
plishment or omission of the act but only to the penalty prescribed for the
certified violation of these laws does not, or so this writer feels, deserve
recognition. If a law is just, if it is commanded in virtue of the common
good, it requires obedience.169
Since the laws against gambling are just and enacted in virtue of the common good,
under this theory they are morally binding."7°
162 See RAAISTEIN, MANUAL OF CANON LAW 561 (1948); BOUSGAREN AND ELLIS, CANON
LAW 736 (1947). Both of these texts take the position that Canon 1499 by its terms "canonizes"
the civil law.
163 Romans 13, 1.
164 2 CATHOLIC ENCYCLOPEDIA 539 (1909). To the same effect see DAVIS, MORAL AND
PASTORAL THEOLOGY 404, 405 (1958).
165 For an exposition of the origin of the purely penal law theory see DAVITY, THE NAT-
URAL LAW (1951).
166 E.g., DAVIS, MORAL AND PASTORAL THEOLOGY 405 (1958).
167 See note 154, supra. In addition, See N.Y. Times, Aug. 24, 1954, p. 15, col. 3. A church
in New Jersey was found to have violated the terms of the New Jersey permissive gambling
law and was ordered to refund $3000.00 which it had realized from an illegal 50-50 game.
In his Sunday sermon, the pastor called the governor "insincere" and branded the legislature
as being "dominated by Protestant ministers." Ibid. Another pastor in a public letter called
the New Jersey Control agency "Meyner's gestapo" and accused the governor of sanctioning
"totalitarian practices." N.Y. Times, Dec. 30, 1955, p. 21, col. 5. A third churchman in his
parish bulletin when his bingo game was closed, wrote that "the politicians have closed down
our bingo game." N.Y. Times, Feb. 14, 1955, p. 21, col. 3.
168 See Davitt, op. cit. supra note 165, at 4, 5.
169 BEGIN, NATURAL LAW AND POSITIVE LAW, 137 (1959).
170 It should be noted that there is a school of Catholic thinkers who argue that civil law
has no authority over matters such as the acquisition of Church property. Rather the church
NOTES
In the final analysis, the most serious objection to the prevalence of Church
gambling is the image of the Church which springs from such activities. Disrespect
for the law and for its officials is taught, and a picture of the Church placing con-
venience before obedience to the law emerges.
To attempt to justify an illegal activity on the ground that it supplies much
needed funds to carry on religious activity is a pragmatic argument which can obvi-
ously not be the basis for legal justification.
If the church desires the law to respect its institutions and values, it should
reciprocate to the extent of respecting the law as written in the gambling area, for
the church is no less bound by the will of the majority in non-religious matters than
is any other societal institution.
The proper remedy of religious institutions here lies in urging exception to the
law, not in blatant disregard of its existing precepts.
III RELIGIOUS VALUES:
A. SUNDAY CLOSING LEGISLATION - A Patent Constitutional Conflict
There has been much activity in the field of Sunday laws within the last two
years, 17 ' but the result of this activity has not presented a clear pattern. In fact, the
area is more confused since the Massachusetts law has been struck down by a
three judge federal district court. 7 2 The most consistent trends can be seen only by
looking at the problem on a state by state basis, but even here there is contra-
diction.
Those who favor the laws usually belong to trade groups or are -members of a
Christian religious sect.'7 3 Opposition is centered mainly in large discount houses,
supermarkets, and members of the Jewish faith who protest on religious grounds 7 4
To date those in favor of the laws in states where they exist have had the better
of the debate,"17 with the courts upholding the laws by stating that they are a valid
exercise of the police power of the state. 7 6 This is indicated by the Ohio court in
State v. Kidd:
1 7 7
The policy of Sunday laws is based upon the observed fact, derived from
long experience and the custom of all nations, that periods of rest from or-
dinary pursuits are requisite to the well-being, morally and physically, of a
people.... This is the foundation and policy of all statutes regulating the
observance of a day of rest, and whether the day selected is one consonant
tolerates such laws. Cf. CICOGNANI, CANON LAw, 119 (1934). The writers of this note are
not in accord with such a view.
171 See generally Annot., 57 A.L.R.2d 975 (1958).
172 Crown Kosher Super Mkt. v. Gallagher, 176 F. Supp. 466 (D. Mass. 1959). Contra,
Two Guys from Harrison-Allentown, Inc. v. McGinley, 28 U.S.L. WEEK 2250-51 (E.D. Pa.,
Dec. 8, 1959).
173 The country's biggest retail trade organization went on record favoring dosing all but
a few kinds of stores. N.Y. Times, Jan. 9, 1958, p. 49, col. 1. However, it should be noted
that there are no supermarkets or discount houses in the organization. Catholics oppose any
change in the New York Sunday law, saying: Sunday is a day of prayer, religious worship and
rest. With due respect to the religious beliefs and practices of others, we maintain that the
present laws concerning the proper observances of Sundays should not be relaxed. N.Y. Times,
Mar. 2, 1958, p. 55, col. 1.
174 N.Y. Times, Jan. 23, 1958, p. 29, col. 6. The New York Board of Rabbis deplored the
discrimination against those who observe Saturday as the day of rest. N.Y. Times, Jan. 30,
1958, p. 15, col. 2. The Rabbinical Council of America expressed the same views. However,
the Jewish ranks are not unanimous in this regard with one Rabbi asserting:
I feel it is no disservice to American freedom of religion to have as a com-
mon day of cessation from business that one in the week on which nearly all
of the 175,000,000 Americans are generally taught to abstain from work.
N.Y. Times, Feb. 9, 1958, p. 59, col. 1.
175 But see Pacesetter Homes, Inc. v. Village of South Holland, 163 N. E.2d 464 (Ill. 1960).
Here, the court held that Sunday laws can be upheld only if they are reasonably connected
to the purpose of avoiding interference with the religious worship of others.
176 See 33 NoRE DAME LAW. 432 et seq. (1958).
177 167 Ohio St. 521, 150 N. B.2d 413 (1958).
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to the religious views of a portion of the people or not does not affect the
validity of the regulation, where no religious observance is enjoined. 1, 8
Until recently the argument along this line seemed to be dominant. However,
the federal court in Massachusetts disregarded it in Crown Kosher Super Mkt. v.
Gallagher 79 and held the state statute unconstitutional as applied to the owners
and customers of a Jewish market and certain rabbis who inspected the market to
enforce compliance with Orthodox dietary laws. Such enforcement was held to
violate due process of law and also the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment to the United States Constitution. The court said that the many
amendments to the law had made it a "hodgepodge" and that:
What Massachusetts has done in this statute is to furnish special protection
to the dominant Christian sects which celebrate Sunday as the Lord's day,
without furnishing such protection, in their religious observances, to those
Christian sects and to Orthodox and Conservative Jews who observe Sat-
urday as the Sabbath, and to the prejudice of the latter group .... With-
out doubt, if they remain faithful to their religious convictions, they will be
under a very substantial disadvantage as compared with shoppers whose Sab-
bath is observed on Sunday.18 0
It had been previously pointed out that the Massachusetts Sunday law was originally
directed "to compel a seemly observance of that day of the week celebrated as the
Sabbath (Sunday) by the dominant Christian sect."'' The dissent attacks the
motives of the market owner, suggesting that commercial gain, and not religious
scruples, was the dominating factor motivating the protest against the law. "2
In New Jersey, a Sunday law was struck down also,' 8 ' but apparently not on
religious grounds. Here, the act provided that its prohibitions would apply to all
counties except three which bordered on the Atlantic Ocean and the court said
that since neither the fact of their geographical location, their population, nor
their employment opportunities provided a valid basis for classification, the statute
was unconstitutional as discriminating against the counties adversely affected.
8 4
McGowan v. State,' a Maryland case, upheld the state Sunday law even though
one of the counties in the state was exempted from the effect of the law. However,
in this case the attack on the statute was not made, as in New Jersey, on the por-
tion exempting certain areas of the state; but, rather the defendant attacked the
statute as being enforced discriminatorily in that it permitted sales of specified
goods and performance of certain kinds of work. The intent of the legislature seems
to have been to permit the county catering to tourists to be open on Sunday, but the
court said this applied only to articles sold at amusement places and did not extend
to the entire county.
In addition to reasons used by the courts to uphold the laws, there are reasons
other than those mentioned by the courts presented for the desirability of these laws,
such as the inclination of the state to give an enforced day of rest to employees through
state legislation. 8 6 Another reason behind these laws is the insistense of storeowners,
who want the day off, that others also be prohibited from working so that no com-
178 Id. at 416.
179 176 F. Supp. 466, 473 (1959):
The characterization of the Sunday law as being merely a civil regulation
providing for a "day of rest" seems to have been an ad hoc improvisation
... because of the realization that the Sunday law would be more vulner-
able to constitutional attack under the state Constitution if the religious
motivation of the statute were more explicitly avowed.
180 Id. at 475.
181 Id. at 472.
182 Id. at 477.
183 N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A: 171-5.1 to 171-5.7 (Supp. 1958).
184 Sarner v. Township of Union, 55 N.J. Super. 523, 151 A.2d 208 (1959). The statute
involved has two contradictory provisions, one providing for severability and the other reject-
ing it.
185 McGowan v. State, 151 A.2d 156 (Md. Ct. App. 1959), appeal docketed, 28 U.S.L.
WEEK 3092 (U.S. Oct. 6, 1959) (No. 438).
186 See Tinder v. Clarke Auto Co., 238 ind. 302, 149 N. E.2d 808 (1958).
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petitive advantage can be gained by those who would open on Sunday 87 Yet
another reason for Sunday laws, especially municipal ordinances in small towns, is
the desire to insure peace and order on Sunday. The Mayor of Saddle River, New
Jersey, said, regarding a local Sunday closing ordinance:
We are not trying to bring back blue Sundays out of any religious mo-
tive.... But business interests began developing the center of town com-
mercially, and now we have two shopping centers along the main street
that bring hundreds of out-of-towners here every Sunday to shatter our
peace and quiet.' 88
The situation in New York is quite confused, with no seeming uniformity
in the decisions. In People v. Gwyer,189 a conviction for violating the Sunday law
was reversed as to an owner of a laundromat because he was prosecuted under the
section of the statute relating to selling rather than that pertaining to the carrying
on of a trade. In another case with similar facts, the conviction was affirmed be-
cause the prosecution was brought under the trade section of the statute.1 90 To
add to the confusion created by different results being reached in factually similar
situations, simply because the prosecution is brought under different sections of the
law, in People v Welt, 191 the owner of a laundromat had his conviction for per-
forming a trade reversed because he was not physically present, hence was not per-
forming a trade. In People v. Rubenstein 92 the defendant was convicted for labor-
ing on Sunday because he opened the door of the laundromat and turned on the
lights. The court distinguished Gwyer and Welt in that here the defendant was
present and he worked; whereas in Gwyer there had been no selling and in Welt
the defendant had not been present. It seems to be generally true, however, that it
is legal for a citizen to do his laundry on Sunday at a laundromat. People v. Ali-
prantis'9 3 applied the ideas of custom and usage permitting such work, and said:
Slovenliness is no part of any religion, nor is it Conducive to rest. Scripture
commends cleanliness. ". . . [A]nd the man shall wash his clothes, and shall
be clean . . . and his clothes being washed he shall be clean." (Leviticus,
ch. 13, pars. 6, 34).'94
A self service supermarket employee was acquitted of selling under the New
York law because she merely did the menial work in the store and, "Thus,
this is no proof that the defendant herein intended to sell or offered for sale the
prohibited meat, within the meaning of the statute, on a Sunday."' 195 A conviction
for selling clothes was upheld even where the defendant claimed that he was within
the exemption granted to roadside markets. 98 The same was true of convictions ob-
tained under the trade and labor sections of the New York statute, where the de-
fendant kept his showroom open on Sunday for the purpose of making appoint-
ments, but his conviction under the selling section of the statute was reversed.
97
In People v. Kupprat'9 the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court had reversed
the conviction of the defendant for selling tombstones near a cemetery on a Sunday
because such actions, according to common understanding, are not serious inter-
ruptions of the repose and religious liberty of the community. However, the Court
of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division and ordered a new trial, saying that
187 Ibid.
188 N.Y. Times, Sept. 1, 1958, p. 15, col. 5.
189 7 App. Div. 2d 711, 179 N.Y.S.2d 987 (1st Dept. 1958).
190 People v. Kaplan, 8 App. Div. 2d 163, 188 N.Y.S.2d 673 (1st Dept. 1959).
191 14 Misc. 2d 275, 178 N.Y.S.2d 313 (Nassau County Ct. 1958).
192 17 Misc. 2d 10, 182 N.Y.S.2d 548 (Ct. Spec. Sess., Kings County 1959).
193 8 App. Div. 2d 276, 187 N.Y.S.2d 477 (1st Dept. 1959).
194 Id. at 480.
195 People v. Kless, 17 Misc. 2d 7, 190 N.Y.S.2d 82, 83 (Buffalo City Ct. 1959).
196 People v. White of Massapequa, Inc., 12 Misc. 2d 254, 171 N.Y.S.2d 452 (Nassau
County Ct. 1958).
197 People v. Polar Vent of America, Inc., 10 Misc. 2d 378, 174 N.Y.S.2d 789 (Nassau
County Ct. 1957), aff'd, 4 N.Y.2d 954, 151 N.E.2d 621, 175 N.Y.S.2d 825 (1958).
198 6 N.Y.2d 88, 160 N. E.2d 38, 188 N.Y.S.2d 483 (1959), reversing 7 App. Div. 2d 739,
180 N.Y.S.2d 628 (2d Dept. 1958).
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such considerations did not make any difference and that the legislature is the one
to make exceptions to the law. Yet, the very same reasoning which was rejected
by the court in the Kupprat case was used to affirm a reversal of a conviction of
the defendant for gratuitously painting his mother-in-law's house on Sunday.199
Likewise, a defendant was acquitted in a case where a police officer induced him
to make a sale on Sunday when the defendant had his store open for his own use
and the officer walked in on him.200 From an analysis of these cases it appears that
the courts in New York are not overly fond of the Sunday laws and will strictly
construe them against enforcement.
The argument based upon sociological and cultural change was urged without
avail in Pennsylvania in Commonwealth v. Taber,201 and the court affirmed the
conviction of the defendant for violating the law against unlawful hunting by en-
gaging in a turkey shoot. The law under which this conviction was obtained was
also upheld in Commonwealth v. Bauder,2 ' where the argument that the law was
being discrirninatorily enforced was rejected.
2 3
The problem in New Jersey became more complicated with the Sarner de-
cision 20 4 striking down the new state law on Sunday regulation, but prior to that
time, problems had arisen with regard to the validity of municipal ordinances
enacted under the authority of the old (pre-1948) law. In Town of W. Orange
v. Carr's Dep't. Store,205 the court upheld a conviction of employees accused of
taking inventory on a Sunday, and refuted the contention that the new act had
repealed the old law so that the ordinance, which had been passed under the old
act, was invalid, by saying:
The purpose of the revision [1958 change] was to leave to municipalities
the power to regulate and control Sunday activity. This they do pursuant
to the Home Rule Act. The 1958 statute does not in the slightest degree
purport to affect this. The ordinance, therefore, is not invalid because it
contains a penalty provision lacking in the statute.
2 0 6
In Indiana, in Tinder v. Clarke Auto. Co.,2r the court upheld the imposition
of a heavier penalty on car dealers who violated the Sunday law than was imposed
199 People v. Deen, 4 N.Y.2d 708, 148 N.E.2d 311, 171 N.Y.S.2d 100 (1958), affirming
3 App. Div. 2d 836, 160 N.Y.S.2d 962 (2nd Deptl 1957). A dissent in the Appellate Division
characterized the "no serious interruption' theory of the majority as judicial legislation. See
also People v. Binstock, 7 Misc. 2d 1039, 170 N.Y.S.2d 133 (Ct. Spec. Sess. 1957). The court
here used similar reasoning to acquit a Jewish storeowner accused of selling on Sunday since
he closed his store on the Sabbath and there were no churches in the town. But see N.Y. Times,
Mar. 21, 1958, p. 23, col. 1: The New York legislature killed a bill permitting storekeepers
in New York City who observe another holy day to open on Sunday.
The principal beneficiaries of the measure would have been Jewish store-
keepers, although it was also supported by the Seventh Day Adventists. The
Roman Catholic Church had taken a stand in opposition to the measure.
200 People v. Oser, 9 Misc. 2d 585, 170 N.Y.S.2d 277 (City of N.Y., Magis. Ct. 1958).
201 188 Pa. Super, 415, 145 A.2d 908 (1958). See also N.Y. Times, Aug. 11, 1959, p. 14,
col. 3 reporting the signing by the Governor of a bill increasing the penalties for violation of
the state's Sunday laws. This law was subsequently declared constitutional. Two Guys from
Harrison-Allentown, Inc. v. McGinley, 28 U.S.L. WFsc 2250-51 (E.D. Pa., Dec. 8, 1959).
202 188 Pa. Super, 424, 145 A.2d 915 (1958).
203 However, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania enjoined a justice of the peace from ar-
resting persons for working on Sunday while it determined the legality of the action. He had
arrested 225 people on sight: toll collectors, newsstand operators, an actress, and maintenance
employees. He claimed he wanted to demonstrate how ridiculous the Sunday law was. N.Y.
Times, July 30, 1959, p. 27, col. 1.
204 See note 183, supra, and accompanying text.
205 53 N.J. Super. 237, 147 A.2d 97 (1958). Accord, Town of West Orange v. Jordan
Corp., 52 N.J. Super. 533, 146 A.2d 124 (1958) which also upheld the Sunday law but re-
versed the conviction of the defendant for showing a model home on Sunday because the ex-
ceptions in the ordinance were not discounted in the complaint. Contra, State v. Ginnis, 158
N. E.2d 553 (Ohio Ct. App. 1959), in which a conviction for selling on Sunday was affirmed
because the defendant did not show that he was within the exemptions.
206 Id. at 102-03.
207 238 Ind. 302, 149 N-E.2d 808 (1958).
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on others violating the law, making much of the fact that all the dealers would
be forced to open on Sunday if some of them did, and playing down the idea that
the difference in penalty was in any way discriminatory. A dissent questions whether
car dealers are so different as to necessitate a heavier penalty.
20 8
On the whole, then, most of the laws regulating activity on Sunday have been
upheld as a valid exercise of the police power of the state. The more recent cases
have involved such things as a zoning ordinance being used to forbid operation of
a laundromat on Sunday;20 9 a city ordinance requiring a license to furnish publicly
Sunday musical entertainment by mechanical means ;210 a city ordinance forbidding
auctions on Sunday; 21' a statute permitting the sale of antiques on Sunday although
forbidding other sales; 212 and various statutes and ordinances forbidding the sale
of goods on Sunday.
21 3
There are usually various types of exceptions made in the Sunday regulatory
schemes, the most common exception being that of necessity.2 14 Another common
exception is that which permits those people to open their stores who observe
Saturday or another day as their day of rest.2 5 In some areas industries which
require continuous operations, are excluded.
2 1 6
Many states have Sunday closing laws which pertain to Sunday activities gen-
erally,217 while others regulate only particular areas, e.g., automobile sales.2 1 The
solution to the problem of whether the prohibition of Sunday activity should be
directed at the sale of certain goods or the operation of certain businesses is sug-
gested by the Arkansas Supreme Court:
A study of the cases indicates that to test discrimination solely on the basis
of the article sold is apt to result in abolishing all exceptions to Sunday laws,
208 Id. at 820 (Babbitt, J., dissenting).
209 State ex rel Superior Corp. v. City of E. Cleveland, 158 N. E.2d 565 (Ohio Ct. App.
1959).
210 Mosey Cafe, Inc. v. Mayor of Boston, 154 N. E.2d 591 (Mass. 1958).
211 ABC Liquidators, Inc. v. Kansas City, 322 S.W.2d 876 (Mo. 1959).
212 State v. Shuster, 145 Conn. 554, 145 A.2d 196 (1958).
213 State v. Kidd, 167 Ohio St. 521, 150 N.E.2d 413 (1958); Kirk v. Olgiati, 308 S.W.2d
471 (Tenn. 1957); Clark v. State, 319 S.W.2d 726 (Tex. Crim. App. 1959).
214 E.g., N.Y. PEN. LAW § 2143.
215 CONN. GEN. STAT. REv. § 53-303 (1958).
216 Mullis v. Celanese Corp. of America, 108 S.E.2d 547 (S.C. 1959); S.C. CODE § 64-6
(1952).
217 CONN. GEN. STAT. REv. §§ 53-300 to 303 (1958) as amended (Supp. 1959); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 28, § 906 (1953) as amended (Supp. 1958); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 855.01 to
.07 (Supp. 1958); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 26-6901 to 20 (1935); IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 18-6202
(1947) and § 18-6203 (Supp. 1959); IND. ANN. STAT. § 104301 to 4303 (1956), and § 10-
4304 (Supp. 1959); KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 14-417 (1949) and §21-955-956 (1949); Ky.
REv. STAT. ANN. § 436-160 (1955); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 51-191 to 193 (1950); ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. ch. 134, §§ 35 to 45 (1954); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27 §§ 492 to 534 (1957)
as amended (Supp. 1959); MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 136 (1957) as amended (Supp. 1959);
MIcH. COMP. LAWS §§ 435.1 to .8 (1948); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 614.28 to .31 (1947);
Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 2368 to 71 (1942); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 563.690 to .730 (1953); MONT.
REV. CODES ANN. § 94-35-216 (1947); NEB. Ray. STAT. § 28-940 (1956); NEv. REV. STAT.
§ 201.260 (Supp. 1955); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 578:3 to :5 (1955); N.J. REv. STAT.
§§ 2A:171.1 to .11 (1951) as amended (Supp. 1958) and N.J. SEs. L. Ch. 119, p. 213
(No. 5, 1959); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 40-44-1 to -5 (1953); N.Y. PEN. LAWS §§ 2140 to 54;
N. D. REV. CODE § 40-0503 (1943) and §§ 12-2114 to 2122 (1943) as amended (Supp. 1957) ;
OHIO REv. CODE ANN. §§ 3773.23 to .99 (Page 1953) as amended (Supp. 1959); OXILA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 21, §§ 907 to 911 (1958); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §§ 632, 4699.4 (1945) and
PuRDoN's PA. LEG. SER., Act. 212, p. 660 (1959) ; R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §§ 11-40-1 to -4
(1956) and §§ 5-23-2 and -3 (1956); S.C. CODE §§ 64-1 to -6 (1952) as amended (Supp.
1959); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 39-4001 to 4003, 4005 (1955); TEx. PEN. CODE ANN. arts.
283 to 287 (1952); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 76-55-1, 2 (1953); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, §§ 3301
to 3308 (1958); VA. CODE ANN. § 18-329 (Supp. 1958); WASH. REV. CODE §§ 9.76.010
to 9.76.030 (Supp. 1956); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 6072 (1955) and § 6073 (Supp. 1959);
WYoU. CoMsP. STAT. ANN. § 15-160(11) (1957).
218 See, e.g., COLO. R1v. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-20-1 to -3 (Supp. 1957); N.J. REv. STAT.
§ 2A: 171-71. (Supp. 1958). See also, Annot., 57 A.L.R.2d 1290 (1958).
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for businesses are tending more and more to overlap one another's activi-
ties.
21 9
These Sunday laws have been repeatedly upheld as a valid exercise of the
police power of the state; yet at the same time the very basis of the laws rests on
a religious foundation. Since the element of religion plays such a part in these laws,
an exception should be made for those who actually observe another day as a day
of rest and religious observance. A possible solution to the problem created by this
exception would be to require an election by the owner as to which day he would
be closed. However, this would not provide a means of preventing unscrupulous
persons from selecting a day in the middle of the week as their day of rest, and
thus allowing them to stay open on both Saturday and Sunday, giving them an
advantage over those who truly desire the day of rest on religious principles.
22 0
The exception to the usual observance of the law should exist only when the person
can prove that he does use another day as a day of rest and religious observance.
Such an elective system would obviate the constitutional objections of the
Crown Kosher Super Mkt. case, and, as long as closing on one day or the other was
mandatory, it would deter those who seek to violate the Sunday laws for commercial
reasons alone.
If the "preference of the dominant sect" objection of Crown should evolve into
an establishment of religion rationale, the reconciliation of an elective system
with objections to "establishment" may well be found in the statement by the
spokesman for the New Jersey Catholic Conference in a hearing before the legisla-
ture of that state regarding Sunday laws.
Religion has no place in this matter and I urge you to keep religion out
of it. Sunday is not the only holy day recognized by religious people. I wish
you would consider only public health, safety and welfare in determining
any Sunday legislation. 22'
B. DOMESTIC RELATIONS-An Interested Third Party: The Family
The influence of religious values in family law seems indeed minimal. It is
apparent to the casual observer, that if courts were to devote as much energy to
deciding the religious problems presented as they do in avoiding such issues, the
body of Church-State domestic relations law would be truly ponderous. However,
in the exercise of the broad discretion of trial courts in family matters, desirable re-
sults are obtained in numerous religious controversies, if not based explicitly on the
questions presented, then in spite of them. This is the area of implicit recognition
of religious values where such are recognized at all. To all organized religion,
grounded essentially in the family unit, this is a baffling anomaly.
1) Annulment, Separation and Divorce -Marginal Acquiescence.
Many of the reported cases of attempted marriage dissolution involving reli-
gious issues arise in New York. In dealing with these cases, it should be remem-
bered that adultery is the sole ground for divorce in New York 22  As a result,
annulment for fraud is the remedy usually sought, with post-marital transgressions
often thus translated into breach of contract terminology through the machinations
of unhappily wed litigants.
219 Hickinbothan v. State, 227 Ark. 1032, 303 S.W.2d 565, 567 (1957). See also Hickin-
botham v. Corder, 227 Ark. 713, 301 S.W.2d 30 (1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 841 (1957) in
which the court granted an injunction to restrain the defendant from operating his store on
Sunday. The court here felt it could enjoin a criminal act because the enforcement of the law
was ineffective since the fine was small.
220 It should be borne in mind that this resolution will not be satisfactory to those who
favor Sunday laws because they are trying to keep their towns quiet or to those who are trying
to restrain competition.
221 N.Y. Times, Mar. 14, 1958, p. 51, col. 4.
222 N.Y. Crv. PRAc. ACT. § 1147 (1955). Only two states allow divorces for religious rea-
sons: Ky. REv. STAT. § 403.020(f) (1955), for "Uniting with any religious society whose
creed and rules require a renunciation of the marriage covenant, or forbid husband and wife
NOTES
Thus, the question in New York seems to be "does the claimed ground amount
to vital fraud?" 223 To this query, a religious promise or understanding between
the parties usually draws a negative reply.
Religious convictions may be the basis of conflict between spouses as to the
begetting of children and the inference is strong that although refusal to have
children is not ground for annulment even if religious convictions are involved, a
premarital promise to have children may open the door to judicial dissolution.224
Continuing within the framework of contract theory, the New York courts
appear to recognize an implied promise to have "normal" sexual relations in the
marriage bond but deny that there is an implied promise to have children, even if
religion demands it.225 A premarital agreement not to have children is of no legal
effect, however, unless an "adequate cause" exists. 226 The rationale of this proposi-
tion is that to give any effect to such agreement in a court would be to thwart one
of the primary purposes of marriage and would hence violate public policy. It is
further indicated that a cause of action which may validly subsist on a premarital
promise to have children may be waived by the complaining spouses' acquiescence
in a contrary course of conduct for some time.
227
A not uncommon situation arose in a recent New York case, involving a civil
marriage with a promise by the husband of a subsequent religious ceremony. The
court, apparently convinced by the alien husband's obvious desire to enter the
country on a non-quota basis, that he never intended to keep the promise, granted
an annulment to the wife:
It is settled, and indeed the proposition is not challenged that where one
prospective spouse, in order to induce the other to enter a civil marriage,
makes a promise of a subsequent religious ceremony, without intending to
keep it, an annulment will be granted, at least where, as in the present case,
there has been no consummation by cohabitation.
228
from cohabiting," and N.H. RBv. STAT. ANN. § 458:7 (VIII) (1955) which is quite similar,
although it adds a time requirement.
At least one New York Court has recently abhorred the strict divorce law in a case where
it was reluctantly compelled to follow it:
This is the logical though distressing result of our unrealistic and outmoded
laws against a merited and socially acceptable severance of the marital bond.Such stringency may be warranted where children are involved or where
there is a sudden parting following long years of marital life. But there is
no justification whatever for forcibly perpetuating a totally hopeless mar-
riage in the case of a childless couple who have been physically separatedfor an extended period. Until the legislature liberalizes the divorce law amarriage in name only, such as this, must regrettably be left undisturbed.
La Parle v. LaParle, 8 Misc.2d 691, 168 N.Y.S.2d 746, 748 (Sup. Ct. 1957).
223 See Lepides v. Lepides, 254 N.Y. 73, 171 N.E. 911, 913 (1930) :
The fraud which may dissolve the marriage tie must relate to somethingvital. ... The law of this state affords no relief to subsequent disappoint-
ment.
224 See Attar v. Attar, 15 Misc. 2d 792, 181 N.Y.S.2d 265, 267 (Sup. Ct. 1958).
The sworn duy of a judge in such matters is to adhere to the law of the
land, to the clear and positive law of this state which does not sanction adissolution of marriage for refusal to bear children, absent an unredeemed
promise so to do. Thus no matter how sincere and even understandable is
the husband's present purpose, his deep religious-feelings cannot alone serve
as a basis for the annulment of the marriage.
But cf. Mirizio v. Mirizio, 242 N.Y. 74, 85, 150 N.E. 605, 613 (1926) (wife's refusal to co-habit until religious ceremony as per premarital agreement is a defense to her action for aban-
donment).225 Compare Lopez v. Lopez, 10 Misc. 2d 367, 169 N.Y.S.2d 74 (Sup. Ct. 1957) wth At-
tar v. Attar, 15 Misc. 2d 792, 181 N.Y.S.2d 265 (Sup. Ct. 1958).
226 Height v. Height, 18 Misc. 2d 1023, 187 N.Y.S.2d 260 (Sup. Ct. 1959); Frost v. Frost,
15 Misc. 2d 104, 181 N.Y.S.2d 562 (Sup. Ct. 1958). See also Sarda v. Sarda, 153 A.2d 305
(D.C. Mun Ct. App. 1959).
227 Riedi v Riedl, 153 A.2d 639 (D.C. Mun. Ct. App. 1959) ; Dougherty v. Dougherty, 10Misc. 2d 429, 169 N.Y.S.2d 242 (Sup. Ct. 1957).
228 Brillis v. Brillis, 4 N.Y.2d 125, 149 N. E.2d 510, 173 N.Y.S.2d 3, 5 (1958). But cf.
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Almost totally denied as a basis for divorce, religious values have found a glimmer
of recognition in actions for annulment for fraud, although as a practical matter
the burden of convincing a court of an original intent not to keep the religious
promise is an onerous one for a complainant to shoulder. Further, this question's
resolution presupposes a favorable decision on the issue of whether or not the
promise was a material inducement to enter into the contract.
2) Agreements and Religious Training of the Child - Substitution of Values
After a divorce, annulment or separation has taken place, the courts are often
called upon to give effect to an ante-nuptial agreement concerning the children
of the marriage. More often than not, these agreements pertain to the religious
upbringing of the child. They are often embodied at least partially in the decree
dissolving the marriage, although a careful examination of the cases discloses that
there is little practical advantage gained by so doing, at least as far as religious
provisions are concerned.
It should be noted at the outset that a court will not, as a general rule, meddle
in family affairs when the parents are still living together. Thus, the Alabama
Supreme Court reversed a lower court injunction preventing a wife from interfering
with the parochial education of the child in violation of an ante-nuptial agreement.1
The equity court was held to have no jurisdiction in a family disagreement, absent
a separation or custody controversy. Counsel had raised the rather novel argument
that the court decree below, since it, in effect, ordered attendance at a school where
there was mandatory denominational teaching, gave an unconstitutional preference
to one sect. The issue was avoided by the denial of jurisdiction.
The Ohio Court of Appeals squarely faced the issue of a pre-nuptial agreement
to raise the child in a particular religion in Hackett v. Hackett.23 0 In holding the
agreement unenforceable by judicial decree, the court recognized that the agreement
could not have been enforced while the parents were together and extended this
doctrine even further:
Certainly if an agreement is unenforceable at the time it is made, it does
not gain in stature with respect to its unenforceable provisions because of
the subsequent divorce of the parties. 23'
The right to educate and train children, to this court, followed custody, with
absolutely no consideration given to a contrary agreement. 23 2
Actually, an award of custody by the court in a valid divorce decree need
not give the parent having custody the sole right to choose the child's religion,
and week-end "visitation" rights of the non-custodial parent may be used to provide
Mirizio v. Mirizio, 242 N.Y. 74, 150 N. E. 605 (1926), denying a wife claiming abandonment
any support because her refusal to cohabit until the performance of a promised religious cere-
mony was based upon inadequate legal reasons:
... her position amounts to legal misconduct, which, under the provisions
of section 1163 of the Civil Practice Act, is a defense to her action to en-
force such obligations. Id. at 608.
There was no cohabitation in either case and, viewed as a precedent, Brillis represents a healthy
step away from Mirizio and the cases following it. See 33 NOTRE DAME LAW. 453 (1958).
229 Kilgrow v. Kilgrow, 268 Ala. 475, 107 So.2d 885 (1958).
230 150 N. E.2d 431 (Ohio Ct. App. 1958), appeal dismissed, 168 Ohio St. 373, 154 N. E.2d
820 (1958).
231 Id. at 434.
232 The opinion was additionally critical of the agreement because it represented a restric-
tion of the individual's right to choose his own religion: "Nor can the free choice of religious
practices be circumscribed or controlled by contract. Id. at 433. But cf. Ross v. Ross, 4 Misc.
2d 399, 149 N.Y.S.2d 585 (Sup. Ct. 1956), appeal dismissed, 4 App. Div. 2d 1001, 170
N.Y.S.2d 1006 (1957):
A promise of this kind cannot be treated lightly and although it is but a
spiritual right, it is nonetheless as real and as valuable as any property right.
(p. 589).
This is a discerning pronouncement in a case whose dictum cannot be ignored by any who
would advocate the recognition of religious values in domestic relations courts. See also com-
ment, 33 NOTRE DAME LAW. 455 (1958).
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religious training to the child under another recent Ohio 'ruling.M3 The court rea-
soned "as between Christian religions denominational differences are irrelevant
and can not be the basis of decision by the court."23 4 Recognizing the resulting
anomaly, it continued, "whether the form of training is single or dual is not of
present, or should it be of, concern." 235 Here again, the religious issue is neatly
sidestepped and the decision, by maintaining a painful status quo, has not only-dis-
appointed both litigants but also augurs that the parents' religious differences will
continue to plague the innocent offspring. It is submitted that this case emphasizes
clearly the extent to which a court will go to refuse to decide a religious issue.
The best interests of a child dictate that this conflict be minimized and no matter
which religion is chosen for the child's upbringing, that one be chosen is imperative.
In Hehman v. Hehman,23 6 acting Justice Shapiro of the New York Supreme
Court offered a penetrating human insight into the problem confronting the court:
No court can fail to be distressed by broken marriages and ruptured
homes. These cases of deep unhappiness are rendered all the more tragic
when diversity of religion is one of the causes which aids in destroying what
should be the most joyous human relationship, and one of the most sacred
of human institutions.
237
In this case, a pre-nuptial agreement had provided that alternative children were
to be raised in the husband's religion. There were three children at the time of
separation, and all three were placed in custody of the mother, with rights in the
father to provide for the religious education of the second child. In recognizing the
doctrine of primus inter pares as to the creeds at issue, Justice Shapiro refused to
give effect to the agreement and intimated that the child's best interests would dic-
tate he live in an undivided house and embrace the religion of his maternal custo-
dian, brother and sister. However, since the child was thirteen years old and was
presumably familiar with the tenets of both religions, the choice of which he would
espouse was left with him. It was, to the court, a choice "that would be his right
as an inhabitant of this country, and the day that he, or anyone similarly situated,
loses that right will see our country a whited sepulchre." 23 8 In so holding, the court
felt bound by the decision in Martin v. Martin,23 9 and almost reluctantly left itself
open to the criticisms of the dissent in that case, 24 0 which was acknowledged, in
Hehman, to contain "much merit and logic." 2 1
If anything, the general proposition that a court will not give effect to a freely-
entered pre-marital agreement to rear children in a particular religion, when con-
fronted with an action against a recalcitrant party, has become stronger than ever
in the past two years. Perhaps, as suggested by Justice Shapiro in Hehman, the
answer to this grave sociological problem lies not in the courts but with the religious
institutions themselves, since they, in effect, have the power to deal with the problem
before it arises:
All of the major religions are sensitive. to religious intermarriage. Thus, to
cite only a few, the "Code of Canon Law" contains several canons forbid-
ding Catholics to marry non-Catholics; the Methodist Church, in May, 1956,
adopted a resolution stating in part, ". . . It is therefore strongly urged
that each young person consider carefully before becoming engaged to any-
one who does not have a similar religious background"; and The United
Lutheran Church, in October 1956, adopted a resolution stating in part,
... Congregations and youth and student groups of the church should
233 Angel v. Angel, 2 Ohio Op. 2d 136, 140 N. E.2d 86 (C. P. 1956).
234 Id. at 88.
235 Ibid.
236 13 Misc. 2d 318, 178 N.Y.S.2d 328 (Sup. Ct. 1958).
237 Id. at 329.
238 Id. at 331.
239 283 App. Div. 721, 127 N.Y.S.2d 851 (1954), aff'd per curiam, 308 N.Y. 136, 123
N.E.2d 812 (1954).
240 308 N.Y. 136, 123 N.E.2d 812, 812 (1954). For an extensive critical comment, see 33
NoTRa Dmm LAW. 456-57 (1958).
241 13 Misc. 2d 318, 178 N.Y.S.2d 329, 331 (Sup. Ct. 1958).
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continue to carry on educational programs regarding the special problems
in mixed marriages. The inevitable compromise on denial of the faith and
the social and cultural problems usually accompanying such marriages should
be thoroughly explained." 242
3) Adoption and Custody of Children -Practical Commingling
In earlier times agency and/or judicial dissatisfaction with an applicant's
"religious background" often had to be overlooked if the child was to be
placed. Today such dissatisfaction can easily be made decisive; other appli-
cants, equally well qualified in other respects and with the proper religious
qualifications, are readily available as substitutes.
2 4 3
Even in this seemingly ideal situation, few, if any, phases of the adoptive process
have been the subject of more bitterness and controversy than the matter of religion.
Illustrative of the point is Matter of Maxwell.24 The mother had been separated
from her husband since 1950, and had had six children by him while living with
him. Of these six, only one was living with her in 1953, as the Canadian authorities
had taken the others from her. At this time the mother became pregnant by a
paramour and the child involved in this litigation was the product of that illicit
relationship. Desiring to conceal the situation, the mother went from Canada to
New York, under an assumed name, to give birth to the child. At this time she told
her obstetrician that she did not want the baby. Several hours after the baby was
born, she signed an affidavit consenting to the adoption, and declared that she did
not embrace any religious faith. She then left the hospital and the baby and re-
turned to Canada with her paramour. One year later, in adoption proceedings,
she raised the objection that the couple desiring to adopt the child were Protestants,
that she wanted the child returned to her, and, in any event, she desired him to
be brought up a Roman Catholic. The trial judge granted the order of adoption,
giving custody to the Protestant couple, who agreed in turn to have the child bap-
tized in the Catholic faith and educated in a Catholic elementary and high school.
This decision was affirmed by the New York Court of Appeals. 245 Speaking for
the majority, Judge Fuld stated:
It is, of course, the settled policy of this state to insist upon adoption by
persons of the same religious faith as that of the child. But this policy does
not require a court to deny custody to adoptive parents where a child has
been accepted by them following a declaration or representation by the
mother, which may or may not be true, that she does not embrace any reli-
gious faith. If the rule were otherwise, the foster parents would ever run
the risk of not being able to adopt the child, and the child ever subjected
to the danger of having attachments formed painfully severed, for how may
it be known that the natural mother has not lied about her religious affilia-
tion? 246
A strong dissent by Judge Desmond criticized the majority on two grounds. He
first reasoned that the state constitution2 4 7 and four different state statutes248 ap-
plicable to varying situations, all state the heretofore policy of New York, 24 that
"when practicable," adoption must be by persons of the same religious faith as the
child. The dissent pointed out that:
In the present case no effort was made to find adoptive parents of the same
242 Id. at n. 330.
243 Broeder and Barrett, Impact of Religious Factors in Nebraska Adoptions, 38 NEBR. L.
Rv. 641, 642 (1959).
244 4 N.Y.2d 429, 151 N.E.2d 848, 176 N.Y.S.2d 281 (1958). For comments, see 25
BROOKLYN L. Rav. 334 (1959); 10 SYRAcusE L. REv. 124 (1958); and 6 U.C.L.A.L. REv.
459 (1958). See also, In re Stone's Adoption, 156 A.2d 808 (Pa. 1959).
245 4 N.Y.2d 429, 151 N.E.2d 848, 176 NY.S.2d 281 (1958).
246 Id. at 284.
247 N.Y. CONST. art. VI § 18.
248 N.Y. Dom. REL. LAws § 112; N.Y. Soc. WELFARE LAWS § 373; N.Y.C. CHILDREN'S
CT. ACT. § 26; and N.Y.C. Doms. REL. CT. ACT § 88.
249 A number of states besides New York have statutory requirements as to religious consid-
erations in adoptions, and statutes of at least five states contain the identical phrase "when
practicable" See: GA. CODE ANN. § 24-2423 (1959); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 210, § 5B
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faith as that of the child... . As to whether an adoption to Catholic par-
ents was practical, there is no proof.., but it is inconceivable that in the
City of Buffalo such persons could not be found.
25 0
The second reason for the dissent was based on the public policy argument for-
bidding the giving of finality to a promise taken in the hospital just after birth
from a woman who was not adequately advised or informed as to the religion of
the proposed adoptive parents.
The status of the natural parents in Maxwell gave the majority a peg to hang
the decision on. As a result of the decision, there is precedent for a situation where
Protestant parents are raising, or have agreed to raise, a Catholic child. Recently,
in commenting upon the Maxwell and related decisions, in attempting to focus
attention on the complex legal-religious problems, professor Paul Ramsey of Prince-
ton poignantly stated:
In a too zealous effort to safeguard religion in adoption proceedings, the
state has chosen legal methods of dubious constitutional validity and of
questionable effect upon the family unit, based on determinations of religion
it is not competent to make. A solution may be found in large part by more
adequate judicial consideration of the religion of the child, and by the exer-
cise of discretion by the court in any adoption proceeding where a religious
question arises to enable the creation of a new familial relation which will
"imitate natural sonship perfectly." 2 51
It is evident that such a policy of requiring the adopted child to be reared in
some religious faith, preferably that of its natural parents, may prevent many
couples from adopting children. For this reason Protestant 25 2 and Jewish 5 ' groups
have opposed such laws, but Catholic officials have been most insistent that the
religious requirement in the adoption law be retained, and, if possible, strength-
ened.2 54 Officials of non-Catholic agencies have expressed the opinion that the
trend in the country is for the adoption laws to become stricter, not weaker. Their
opinion was based on the increasing influence of Roman Catholics in matters of
legislation. 2. 5 In any event, the impact of this religious factor is being recognized
by our legal and social institutions today.
2 6
The influence of religious values is more subtle in litigation between separated
and divorced parents for the custody of their children. These cases usually turn on
issues of parental fitness with the theological aspect only incidental. In a recent
New Jersey case, Sheehan v. Sheehan,25 7 the mother had committed adultery and
subsequently married her paramour, himself the father of seven children by a prior
marriage. The mother brought the action to obtain the custody of her two daughters
from the father. The court applied the "best interest" test, the keystone of which
is the "welfare" of the children. The court stated that welfare concerns, inter alia,
the spiritual and social welfare of the child. The court noted that the mother,
although professing to supervise the religious education of the children, had been
(1955); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 211.221 (Supp. 1959); NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-216 (1952); and
R. I. GEN. LAws ANN. § 15-7-13 (1956). ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 4 § 9.1-15 (Smith-Hurd Supp.
1959) uses the words "whenever possible."
250 Matter of Maxwell, 4 N.Y.2d 429, 151 N.E.2d 848, 176 N.Y.S.2d 281, 289 (1958)
(dissent).
251 Ramsey, The Legal Imputation of Religion to an Infant in Adoption Proceedings, 34
N.Y.U.L. REv. 649 (1959). Apparently the latter quote is from ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA
THEOLOGICAE, III (Supp.), Q. 57, art. 1.
252 The New York Council of Churches called for a relaxation of religious requirements in
state adoption laws. New York Times, Dec. 22, 1959, p. 13, col. 7.
252 The Hebrew Congregations Union opposes state legislation requiring religious tests for
adoptive parents. New York Times, Nov. 19, 1959, p. 82, col. 2.
254 New York Times, Oct. 11, 1959, p. 1, col. 2.
255 Id. at p. 82, col. 2.
256 AMERICAN LAw INSTITUTE, FAMILY LAw 52 (1958), notes this growing importance.
For varying views on religion in adoption and custody, see generally, 1 INSTITUTE OF CHURCH
AND STATE, CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS, RELIGION IN ADOPTION AND CUSTODY CASES 56-114
(1958).
257 51 N.J. Super. 276, 143 A.2d 874 (1958).
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excommunicated from the Roman Catholic Church as a result of her second mar-
riage. In Sheehan, even though the mother testified that she attended church reg-
ularly258 and the daughters testified that they would rather live with her, the court
denied her custody and put the children in a boarding school some distance from
home, continuing custody in their father.
In Hall v. Hall,259 the theological element was a little more unusual. The father
had obtained a modification of the divorce decree, on the mother's nonappearance,
awarding him the custody of their children on the ground of neglect arising out
of an averred polygamous climate in which the mother was rearing the children.
The mother then brought an action to get back the custody of the children. The
Utah court ruled in her favor and affirmed the lower court's exclusion of evidence
tending to show that she engaged in polygamous practices. In so holding, the court
stated:
There was no evidence ... to the effect that, whether she at one time had
embraced polygamy as a religious tenet or not, she either presently or for
sometime past espoused or practiced such dogma or attempted the un-
likely chore of teaching it to her children, the eldest of which was only
seven years old.260
The Utah court appeared to overlook the moral aspects of the mother's past
conduct.
281
There have been other cases where the doctrinal issue has been more pro-
nounced. In Battaglia v. Battaglia,26 2 the parents had been married in the Presby-
terian Church, which was also where their child was subsequently baptized. Later
the wife became a Jehovah's Witness. As a result of this, a clash developed which
led to their separation. The father alleged that as a result of the mother's absorp-
tion in the activities of her newly embraced religion she neglected the child and
would not permit a necessary blood transfusion, even though the child's life might
thereby be saved. The New York Court awarded the custody of the child to the
father, and stated:
She has not, however, the right to impose upon an innocent child the
hazards to it flowing from her own religious convictions. The welfare of the
child is paramount. If medical science requires a blood transfusion to pre-
serve the child's life, the child should not be deprived of life because the
mother's religious persuasion opposes such transfusion. It is of no concern
to the court what religious preference the parents may elect. The best
interests of the child are the primary concern in all custody conflicts and
not the desires of either the father or the mother.
263
It should be noted that the court has neatly avoided an express ruling on this con-
troversial religious tenet, while tacitly disapproving of it in accomplishing a just
and humane result.
I In conclusion it is submitted that religious values may be an element in the
award of custody of children, insofar as it remains a secondary factor to be con-
sidered along with the practical aspects of past conduct weighted to promote the
child's best interest and general welfare.264 Moreover, in none of the cases does
258 Many times both parties seeking custody of their children aver that they attend church
regularly. In Fronk v. State, 7 Utah 2d 245, 322 P.2d 397 (1958), both parties made aver-
ments to that effect, but the court favored the husband, apparently as he had not committed
adultery, and granted him custody under Juvenile Court supervision.
259 7 Utah 2d 413, 326 P.2d 707 (1958). Compare State in Interest of Black, 3 Utah 2d
315, 283 P.2d 887 (1955), cert. denied, 350 U. S. 923 (1955), and for comment, see 5 UTAH
L. REV. 381 (1957). See also, Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
260 Id. at 709.
261 Some courts are more particular about the mother's conduct. See Salley v. Salley, 116
So.2d 296 (La. 1959).
262 9 Misc.2d 1067, 172 N.Y.S.2d 361 (1958).
263 Id. at 362. But see Jackson v. Jackson, 181 Kan. 1, 309 P.2d 705 (1957), dictating a
contrary result should the court allow religion to permeate its decision.
264 New York has a policy of consulting the child as to his preference. See Martin v. Mar-
tin, 308 N.Y. 136, 123 N.E.2d 812 (1954); Hehman v. Hehman, 13 Misc.2d 318, 178
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religious values appear to be the sole basis upon which a parent or other person




N.Y.S.2d 328 (1958). For comment, see 59 COLUM. L. REv. 680 (1959). See also 33 NOTRE
DAmn LAW. 416, 456 (1958). New Jersey continues to consult the child as to his wishes but
his choice is not conclusive. 'Sheehan v. Sheehan, N.J. Super. 276, 143 A.2d 874 (1958);
Matter of Jacques, 48 N.J. Super. 523, 138 A.2d 581 (1958).
